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Abstract
“Below Investment Grade and Above the Law: A Past, Present and Future Look at the Ac-
countability of Credit Rating Agencies” by Professor Marilyn Blumberg Cane, co-authored with
Adam Shamir and Tomas Jodar is a timely and comprehensive Article focusing on the responsibil-
ity, and lack thereof, of credit rating agencies (“CRAs”). The Article is titled “below investment
grade” due to the shoddy performance of the CRAs in light of their key role in the financial crisis
of 2007-08. It is also titled “above the law” because of the CRAs’ lack of accountability due to
regulatory sleight of hand and the CRAs’ almost completely successful defense against liability
to bondholders through the invocation of the freedom of speech under the First Amendment. This
Article covers the evolution of the credit rating industry, in particular, the noteworthy shift from
the purchaser-subscriber to issuer-pays model. It then describes the history of SEC CRA regula-
tory measures, most notably the adoption of SEC Rule 436(g), adopted in 1982, which specifically
eliminated liability for the big CRAs (Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, Fitch’s and Duff and Phelps)
as “experts” under Sections 7 and 11 of the Securities Act of 1933.
This Article then covers the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 and the adoption of SEC
Rule 17g-5, in so far as they attempted to control conflicts of interest within CRAs. This Article
next turns to the freedom of speech as a defense effectively used by CRAs, although the United
States Supreme Court has yet to address this issue directly. The thrust of the CRAs’ argument is
that their ratings are simply their expression of their opinion, akin to a review of a restaurant or
editorial column. There is much irony in this as many regulated financial players, such as banks
and insurance companies, are required to comply with governmental rules that mandate them to
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invest in “investment grade securities,” a “blessing” conferred only by the privately owned CRAs.
Next, this Article dissects provisions regarding CRAs in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010, which among many other things, reads “Rule 436(g), promul-
gated by the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities Act of 1933 shall have no
force or effect.” As the reader will see, this provision has not been enforced by the SEC, whereas
in what could only be seen as a game of hard ball, the CRAs won notwithstanding the Act. For
completeness, this Article then turns to the European approach of CRA regulation, including the
creation of the European Securities and Markets Authority in January 2011.
This Article concludes by suggesting, at a minimum, that CRAs be subject to accountability, and
that some formal, financially neutral body conduct a periodic assessment rating the performance
of the CRAs.
KEYWORDS: Credit Rating, Agency, Investment, Financial Crisis, Liability, First Amendment,
Dodd-Frank, Wall Street Reform, SEC, European, Securities, Markets
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This Article covers the evolution of the credit rating industry, in 
particular, the noteworthy shift from the purchaser-subscriber to 
issuer-pays model. It then describes the history of SEC CRA 
regulatory measures, most notably the adoption of SEC Rule 436(g), 
adopted in 1982, which specifically eliminated liability for the big 
CRAs (Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, Fitch’s and Duff and Phelps) as 
“experts” under Sections 7 and 11 of the Securities Act of 1933.1 
This Article then covers the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 
2006 and the adoption of SEC Rule 17g-5, in so far as they 
attempted to control conflicts of interest within CRAs.2 This Article 
next turns to the freedom of speech as a defense effectively used by 
CRAs, although the United States Supreme Court has yet to address 
this issue directly.3 The thrust of the CRAs’ argument is that their 
ratings are simply their expression of their opinion, akin to a review 
of a restaurant or editorial column.4 There is much irony in this as 
many regulated financial players, such as banks and insurance 
companies, are required to comply with governmental rules that 
mandate them to invest in “investment grade securities,” a “blessing” 
conferred only by the privately owned CRAs. 
Next, this Article dissects provisions regarding CRAs in the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, 
which among many other things, reads “Rule 436(g), promulgated 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities 
Act of 1933 shall have no force or effect.”5 As the reader will see, 
this provision has not been enforced by the SEC, whereas in what 
could only be seen as a game of hard ball, the CRAs won 
notwithstanding the Act. For completeness, this Article then turns to 
the European approach of CRA regulation, including the creation of 
the European Securities and Markets Authority in January 2011.6 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Christopher Keller & Michael Stocker, Reining in the Credit Ratings Industry, 
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 11, 2010, at 1. 
 2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(a) (2010). 
 3. Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other 
Gatekeepers, in FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY PROTECT INVESTORS? 59, 85 
(Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 2006). 
 4. David Segal, A Matter of Opinion?, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2009, at BU1, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/19/business/19floyd.html?pagewanted=all. 
 5. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 939G, 124 Stat. 1376, 1889 (2010). 
 6. Dorothee Fischer-Appelt, The European Securities and Markets Authority: The 
Beginnings of a Powerful European Securities Authority?, LAW & FIN. MKTS. REV., 
Jan. 2011, at 21, available at http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload 
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This Article concludes by suggesting, at a minimum, that CRAs be 
subject to accountability, and that some formal, financially neutral 
body conduct a periodic assessment rating the performance of the 
CRAs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“There are two superpowers in the world today in my opinion. 
There’s the United States and there’s Moody’s Bond Rating Service. 
The United States can destroy you by dropping bombs, and Moody’s 
can destroy you by downgrading your bonds. And believe me, it’s not 
clear sometimes who’s more powerful,” said journalist Thomas 
Friedman regarding the undeniable power of Credit Rating Agencies 
(“CRAs”).7 In light of the August 5, 2011 downgrade of the United 
States’ long-term federal debt by major credit rating agency Standard 
and Poor’s, Mr. Friedman’s words ring truer than ever.8 
CRAs have not always enjoyed such a commanding status, and 
have evolved considerably to become the market-shaping giants they are 
today.9 Millions of investors across the world rely on rating agencies to 
help assess the creditworthiness of particular financial instruments.10 
While these agencies perform a vital function for the financial 
community, many individuals, investors, and organizations heavily 
criticize the rating agencies, notably for their role in the 2007-2008 sub-
prime mortgage crisis.11 CRAs have been blasted for their shoddy 
performance in rating various structured financial instruments, raising 
several questions regarding the accuracy of their ratings and the integrity 
of the process as a whole.12 
                                                                                                                 
 7. The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Interview with Thomas L. Friedman (PBS 
television broadcast Feb. 13, 1996). 
 8. Binyamin Applebaum & Eric Dash, S.& P. Downgrades Debt Rating of U.S. 
for the First Time, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2011, at A1. 
 9. Kevin Voigt, Explainer: The Power of Credit Rating Agencies, CNN (July 15, 
2011, 1:53 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2011/BUSINESS/07/15/credit.ratings.agen 
ncy.explain/index.html. 
 10. Timothy E. Lynch, Deeply and Persistently Conflicted: Credit Rating Agencies 
in the Current Regulatory Environment, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 227, 242 (2009). 
 11. U.S. SEC, SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE COMMISSION 
STAFF’S EXAMINATIONS OF SELECT CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 1 (2008), http://www.se 
c.gov/news/studies/2008/craexamination070808.pdf [hereinafter SEC SUMMARY 
REPORT]. 
 12. Id. at 2. 
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Moreover, certain rating agencies had long been exempt from 
accountability as experts for the ratings that they issue.13 Under former 
Rule 436(g) of the Securities Act of 1933, rating agencies labeled 
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (“NRSROs”) 
enjoyed an exemption from legal accountability as experts when their 
ratings were used in connection with a registered offering.14 Many 
people condemned this exemption for effectively shielding rating 
agencies from accountability, while others considered the exemption to 
be essential for the availability of quality ratings.15 
Under Section 11(b)(3)(B) of the Securities Act of 1933, experts 
(such as engineers, appraisers, or auditors) who have consented to be 
named as having prepared or certified any part of a registration 
statement have liability to persons acquiring securities in registered 
offerings, unless the expert shall sustain the burden of proof that said 
expert “had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to 
believe, and did believe” that the expert’s statements were “true and that 
there was no omission to state a material fact required to be stated 
therein or necessary to make the statements not misleading.”16 In other 
words, experts named in the registration statements have a statutory due 
diligence defense. 
Notwithstanding, the NRSROs were exempt from even this liability 
under Rule 436(g).17 When Congress sought to remove the added 
insulation from liability of Rule 436(g), the NRSROs played hardball.18 
If they were to be held accountable for their ratings, upon which many 
investors rely, indeed, upon which some institutions must rely as their 
investments must be “investment grade”—a “blessing” conferred by the 
NRSROs, by statute or regulation—they would take the ball and go 
                                                                                                                 
 13. Keller & Stocker, supra note 1, at 1. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Tracy Alloway, Why Repealing 436(g)Violates the First Amendment and Other 
Rating Agency Guff, FINANCIAL TIMES (July 22, 2010, 1:45 PM), http://ftalphaville. 
ft.com/blog/2010/07/22/294666/why-repealing-rule-436g-violates-the-first-amend 
ment-and-other-rating-agency-guff/. 
 16. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(B) (2010). 
 17. Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380, 11,391. 
 18. See SEC Concept Release on Possible Rescission of Rule 436(g) Under the 
Securities Act of 1933, Exchange Act Release No. 33-9071 (proposed Oct. 15, 2009), 
available at available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2009/33-9071.pdf 
[hereinafter SEC 2009 Concept Release]. 
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home.19 They would refuse to accept section 11 liability notwithstanding 
what Congress decreed.20 
Despite many half-hearted attempts to regulate CRAs by the SEC 
over the years and most significantly, as discussed below, by Congress 
in its enactment of Dodd-Frank,21 the SEC has been roundly criticized in 
its dealings with the CRAs.22 In the New York Times “Fair Game” 
column entitled “Hey, S.E.C., That Escape Hatch Is Still Open,” 
Gretchen Morgenson wrote: 
But since Dodd-Frank passed, Congress’s noble attempt to protect 
investors from misconduct by ratings agencies has been thwarted by, 
of all things, the Securities & Exchange Commission. The S.E.C., 
which calls itself “the investor’s advocate,” is quietly allowing the 
raters to escape this accountability. 
When Dodd-Frank became law last July, it required that ratings 
agencies assigning grades to asset-backed securities be subject to 
expert liability from that moment on. This opened the agencies to 
lawsuits from investors, a policing mechanism that law firms and 
accountants have contended with for years. The agencies responded 
by refusing to allow their ratings to be disclosed in asset-backed 
securities deals. As a result, the market for these instruments froze 
on July 22. 
The S.E.C. quickly issued a “no action” letter, indicating that it 
would not bring enforcement actions against issuers that did not 
disclose ratings in prospectuses. This removed the expert-liability 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Id.; STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG., 
FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS 102 
(Comm. Print 2002) (hereinafter Watchdogs). 
 20. Anusha Shrivastava, Bond Sale? Don’t Quote Us, Request Credit Firms, WALL 
ST. J. (July 21, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704723604575 
379650414337676.html; Alain Sherter, As Obama Enacts Financial Reform, Credit 
Rating Agencies Fight to Remain Above the Law, CBSNEWS (July 21, 2010), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505123_162-43546702/as-obama-enacts-financial-
reform-credit-rating-agencies-fight-to-remain-above-the-law/. 
 21. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 22. Robert Schmidt & Jesse Hamilton, SEC ‘Capacity Gap’ Risks Oversight 
Lapses as Regulator’s Targets Multiply, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 7, 2011 12:00 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-07/sec-capacity-gap-risks-oversight-lapses-
as-regulator-s-targets-multiply.html. 
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threat for the ratings agencies, and the market began operating 
again.23 
Recognizing rating agencies’ historical benefit of privilege without 
the burden of responsibility, Morgenson further writes: 
Unfortunately, the S.E.C.’s actions appear to continue the decades of 
special treatment bestowed upon the credit raters. Among the 
perquisites enjoyed by established credit raters is protection from 
competition, since regulators were required to approve new entrants 
to the business. Regulators have also sanctioned the agencies’ ratings 
by embedding them into the investment process: financial 
institutions post less capital against securities rated at or above a 
certain level, for example, and investment managers at insurance 
companies and mutual funds are allowed to buy only securities 
receiving certain grades. 
This is a recipe for disaster. Given that ratings were required and the 
firms had limited competition, they had little incentive to assess 
securities aggressively or properly. Their assessments of mortgage 
securities were singularly off-base, causing hundreds of billions in 
losses among investors who had relied on ratings. 
That the S.E.C.’s move strengthens the ratings agencies’ protection 
from investor lawsuits, which runs counter to the intention of Dodd-
Frank, is also disturbing. Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s have 
argued successfully for years that their grades are opinions and 
subject to the same First Amendment protections that journalists 
receive. This position has made lawsuits against the raters 
exceedingly difficult to mount, a problem that Dodd-Frank was 
supposed to fix.24 
Finally, Morgenson concludes that the SEC’s efforts have been 
counterproductive to the legislative intent of Dodd-Frank: 
I[t] is certainly important that the S.E.C. work to eliminate 
references to ratings in the investment arena, and to reduce investor 
reliance on them. But Congress couldn’t have been clearer in its 
intent of holding the agencies accountable. That the S.E.C. is 
undermining that goal is absurd in the extreme.25 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Gretchen Morgenson, Hey, S.E.C., That Escape Hatch is Still Open, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2011, at BU1. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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The Morgenson column was spurred by a letter written by 
Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley to SEC Chairman 
Mary Shapiro on March 1, 2011.26 That letter was in response to two no 
action letters issued by the SEC’s Division of Corporate finance to Ford 
Motor Credit in 2010.27 Attorney General Coakley’s letter states: 
These [no action] letters state that the Division will not recommend 
enforcement action if issuers of asset-backed securities (“ABS”) do 
not comply with the ratings disclosure requirements of Regulation 
AB, and thus fail to secure for investors the duty of competence 
mandated by Section 11 of the Securities Act. Since last July, many 
issuers have registered asset-backed securities without the required 
ratings disclosure and consents by rating agencies to Section 11 
liability. 
As a matter of policy, we believe that creating a duty of competence 
for rating agencies under Section 11 is a good thing. We believe that 
Congress rescinded the rating agencies’ exemption from liability 
with the expectation that this would result in rating agency liability. 
While the Commission, in its prosecutorial discretion, may decide it 
will not bring enforcement action in a given area, we are concerned 
about the no-action letters for two reasons. First, we believe the 
SEC’s decision to take no action in this area undermines recent 
Congressional reform and is inconsistent with Congressional intent. 
Second, the Commission’s no-action letters to Ford Motor Credit 
have resulted in significant uncertainty for both governmental actors 
and private parties. Legally, no-action letters are expressions of 
enforcement policy. In practice, they are public statements by SEC 
staff often taken to imply legal interpretations and administrative 
action they do not contain. Yet the Commission’s exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion does not affect whether SEC regulations and 
the federal securities laws are being violated. We urge the 
Commission to enforce Regulation AB in its entirety, in particular 
with regard to the prospectus disclosure of ratings, as well as to 
clarify the duties of issuers.28 
Attorney General Coakley concludes her letter by stating: 
                                                                                                                 
 26. See Letter from Martha Coakley, Attorney General of Massachusetts, to Mary 
Schapiro, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Mar. 1, 2011) [hereinafter 
Coakley Letter], available at http://www.mass.gov/Cago/docs/press/2011_03_07 
_sec_letter_attachment1.PDF. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 1-2. 
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We ask the Commission to enforce Regulation AB in its entirety and 
in a manner consistent with the intent of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
Although we are aware that the rating agencies declined to 
participate in the securitization markets for the day of July 22, 2010, 
we believe that the SEC should let the market set rating agency 
pricing reflecting the Section 11 duty of competence. Calculating 
risk of loss is the business of the rating agencies.29 
I. THE CREDIT RATINGS INDUSTRY 
A credit rating agency is an organization that uses various models 
to rate debt instruments and companies on a proprietary scale, typically 
ranging from AAA premium ratings to junk bond ratings.30 CRAs “help 
lenders pierce the fog of asymmetric information that surrounds lending 
relationships. . . . [and] help borrowers (and their credit qualities) 
emerge from that same fog.”31 
The origin of CRAs lies in the desire of investors to be able to 
evaluate the creditworthiness of a particular instrument without relying 
on the biased representations made by its seller.32 Investors took 
satisfaction in the independence of CRAs, which charged subscription 
fees to the investing community in exchange for access to the valuable 
ratings.33 John Moody, who founded Moody’s Investor Services, is 
credited as a pioneer in the development of credit ratings in the early 
twentieth century.34 Moody’s issued its first ratings in 1909.35 
A. THE ISSUER-PAYS BUSINESS MODEL 
 Investors who sought advice on the likelihood of default of 
corporate bonds flocked to Moody’s and other rating agencies, buying 
subscriptions to access the valuable information.36 However, the 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Id. at 10. 
 30. Caitlin M. Mulligan, From AAA to F: How the Credit Rating Agencies Failed 
America and What Can be Done to Protect Investors, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1275, 1279 
(2009). 
 31. Lawrence J. White, The Credit Rating Industry: An Industrial Organization 
Analysis 4 (Feb. 12, 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.stern.nyu 
.edu/eco/wkpapers/workingpapers01/01-02White.pdf. 
 32. Keller & Stocker, supra note 1. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Mulligan, supra note 30, at 1279. 
 35. White, supra note 31, at 8. 
 36. Mulligan, supra note 30, at 1279. 
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evolution of capital markets made the subscriber-paid business model 
less profitable, and rating agencies instead directed their services toward 
the issuers of securities in an “issuer-pays” business model.37 As the 
market evolved, investors began to demand that new issues of securities 
retain at least one credit rating.38 Since issuers were increasingly 
expected to issue rated securities, the rating agencies realized that their 
service was better catered to the issuers than individual investors.39 
Further, agencies faced difficulties in keeping their ratings away from 
non-subscribers, so subscribers quickly became reluctant to continue 
paying for ratings that increasingly became public information.40 
Another factor that led to the issuer-pays model was that securities had 
grown more complex, and agencies needed more resources than 
subscription fees alone were generating.41 
In the United States, the largest rating agencies are Standard and 
Poor’s, Moody’s Investor Services, and Fitch.42 It is estimated that 
Standard and Poor’s is responsible for issuing about half of all credit 
ratings, and the “big three” combined issue approximately ninety-eight 
percent of all ratings.43 Each major CRA in the United States derives 
most of its revenue from contracts with securities issuers to rate their 
securities.44 Issuers of securities typically provide rating agencies with 
confidential or nonpublic information about their businesses and 
securities.45 The agencies use this information to craft a creditworthiness 
assessment, and then make their opinion publicly available.46 
This “issuer-pays” business model creates an inherent conflict of 
interest between CRAs and the issuers of the securities that CRAs are 
being paid to rate.47 The major rating agencies generally downplay the 
significance of this conflict, and claim that their reputations are far too 
valuable for them to succumb to any inherent biases in their business 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Id. 
 38. Timothy E. Lynch, supra note 10, at 239.  
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Mulligan, supra note 30, at 1279. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Lynch, supra note 10, at 234. 
 45. Id. at 237. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 235. 
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model.48 Sometimes rating agencies disclose the methodologies they use 
to calculate a credit rating, but they often provide only a basic rationale 
of the credit analysis, leaving much of the justification for a rating to be 
questioned.49 
II. HISTORY OF SEC RATING AGENCY REFORM 
A. EXPERT ACCOUNTABILITY 
Two important laws that relate to the legal accountability of 
experts, and potentially credit rating agencies, are Sections 7 and 11 of 
the Securities Act of 1933.50 Section 7 requires the written consent of 
any expert who has helped prepare or certify a registration statement.51 
If any accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose 
profession gives authority to a statement made by him, is named as 
having prepared or certified any part of the registration statement, or 
is named as having prepared or certified a report or valuation for use 
in connection with the registration statement, the written consent of 
such person shall be filed with the registration statement.52 
Section 11 of the Act details the liability of an expert who has made 
untrue affirmations on a registration statement, and affords a cause of 
action to those who are misled by false statements.53 
In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became 
effective, contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted 
to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to 
make the statements therein not misleading, any person acquiring 
such security . . . may, either at law or in equity, in any court of 
competent jurisdiction, sue . . . every accountant, engineer, or 
appraiser, or any person whose profession gives authority to a 
statement made by him, who has with his consent been named as 
having prepared or certified any part of the registration statement, or 
as having prepared or certified any report or valuation which is used 
in connection with the registration statement, with respect to the 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 238. 
 50. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77k (2010). 
 51. See id. § 77g(a). 
 52. Id. 
 53. See id. § 77k(a)(4). 
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statement in such registration statement, report, or valuation, which 
purports to have been prepared or certified by him . . . .54 
If CRAs are considered “experts” under Section 7, their written 
consent would be required in order for a registration statement to 
disclose their rating.55 Denoting the agencies as experts would also mean 
that they could be sued for issuing a misleading rating that was disclosed 
as part of a registration statement under Section 11.56 According to the 
SEC, the purpose of Section 11 was to subject anyone with a direct role 
in a registered offering to a more rigorous standard of liability, assuring 
accurate disclosure regarding securities.57 
The potential for liability has led credit rating agencies to label 
their ratings as opinions rather than “expert” advice.58 They believe their 
ratings are analogous to other published opinions, such as editorials or 
restaurant reviews.59 As such, CRAs frequently utilize the “personhood” 
of corporations in conjunction with the First Amendment protection of 
freedom of speech as a defense against legal claims.60 Standard & Poor’s 
is so serious about this defense that it hired the legendary Floyd Abrams, 
a veteran in the freedom of speech arena.61 A major issue arises when 
agencies regard their ratings as mere opinions, while at the same time 
major market participants are continuously encouraged and sometimes 
even obligated to utilize rating agencies.62 This creates an “unavoidable 
reliance on the agencies and a financial market characterized by a 
commingling of institutions.”63 
 
                                                                                                                 
 54. Id. 
 55. Concept Release on Possible Rescission of Rule 436(g) Under the Securities 
Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. pt. 220, 4-5 (proposed Oct. 15, 2009), available at 
www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2009/33-9071.pdf [hereinafter SEC 2009 Concept Release]. 
 56. Id. at 2-3. 
 57. Id. The SEC also notes that Section 11 afforded investors additional protection 
from barriers to recovery under certain common law fraud requirements. Id. 
 58. Parisa Haghshenas, Note, Obstacles to Credit Rating Agencies First 
Amendment Defense in Light of Abu Dhabi, 8 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 452, 453 (2010). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Segal, supra note 4, at BU1. 
 62. Haghshenas, supra note 58, at 453. 
 63. Id. 
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B. NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED STATISTICAL  
RATINGS ORGANIZATIONS 
 
Ratings issued by CRAs are significant for two reasons: (1) 
investors rely on them for an assessment of a product or company’s 
creditworthiness, and (2) many entities are limited to purchasing 
products rated “investment grade” by Nationally Recognized Statistical 
Ratings Organizations.64 The origin of the “NRSRO” designation began 
in 1975, but the history of the concept dates further back.65  
Our financial system and capital markets have shown that major 
interruptions in the flow of capital, such as institutional insolvencies, 
create huge losses for investors holding a stake in those institutions.66 
Since 1931, the United States “safety-and-soundness” regulation of 
financial institutions has progressed with the goal of protecting investors 
from losses arising from insolvencies, while also preserving the stability 
of the banking system.67 With so much money riding on financial 
institutions and the riskiness of the various assets they hold, regulators 
sought to limit that risk by specifying which assets institutions like 
banks could hold.68 This was done by either prohibiting institutions from 
holding securities below a specified grade or by setting minimum capital 
requirements for holding certain securities pursuant to their ratings.69 
These requirements created a specific demand for creditworthiness 
ratings.70 However, the question of whose ratings could be used for 
regulatory purposes remained unanswered until 1975.71 
In 1975, the SEC revised its Net Capital Rule by applying it to 
broker-dealers in order to ensure that they had enough “liquid assets to 
meet their obligations to their investors and creditors.”72 Broker-dealers 
were required to maintain net capital over some calculated amount.73 A 
broker-dealer calculating this minimum amount could deduct the 
“percentages of the market value of their securities from their total net 
                                                                                                                 
 64. See Mulligan, supra note 30, at 1278-79. 
 65. See White, supra note 31, at 23. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 24. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Net Capital Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1976). 
 73. Id. 
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worth.”74 Under the 1975 revisions, banks could base their capital 
requirements on the ratings of the securities they held, and certain 
securities were subjected to lower margin requirements if at least two 
NRSROs rated them as investment grade.75 In specifying rating 
requirements, the SEC was next faced with the question of whose 
ratings could be used, which it answered by creating the NRSRO 
designation.76 
Unfortunately, the SEC did not define or clarify the term “NRSRO” 
at that time.77 The SEC also neglected to specify how a normal rating 
agency could ascend to NRSRO status.78 Even without an “NRSRO” 
definition, it was certainly understood that Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, 
and Fitch would fall under this select class of CRAs.79 Recognition by 
the SEC as an NRSRO is important because most ratings-dependent 
regulations make reference to only those select few agencies designated 
by the SEC as NRSROs.80 In setting its margin requirements on the 
basis of ratings issued by CRAs, the SEC cemented the rating agencies’ 
role in U.S. financial markets.81 
 
C. EARLY REFORM OF RATING  
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 
 
In 1977, the SEC issued a concept release seeking comment on 
whether it should allow, encourage, or require corporate debt security 
ratings to be disclosed on registration statements and prospectuses.82 
Traditionally, the SEC did not permit such disclosure in reports filed 
with the Commission, but several factors led to consideration of whether 
its stance should change.83 These factors include recommendations from 
the staff, letters from the public, literature by security professionals, and 
                                                                                                                 
 74. Mulligan, supra note 30, at 1281. 
 75. Id. 
 76. White, supra note 31, at 24. 
 77. Mulligan, supra note 30, at 1281. 
 78. Id. 
 79. White, supra note 31, at 24 n.45. 
 80. Lynch, supra note 10, at 245. 
 81. Mulligan, supra note 30, at 1281. 
 82. Disclosure of Security Ratings, 42 Fed. Reg. 58,414, 58,414 (proposed Nov. 9, 
1977). 
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its own experience in administering securities laws.84 The SEC was 
merely seeking comments on its proposal, and did not publish any new 
guidelines in this release.85 
The 1977 release acknowledged that security ratings are frequently 
used in the investing community, and that reliance on ratings was 
widespread in the securities markets.86 The SEC noted that ratings 
already play a pivotal role in its Net Capital Rule, whereby certain 
“haircut” deductions were permitted on short-term commercial paper 
that is recognized as “investment grade” by at least two NRSROs.87 One 
of the SEC’s inquiries in the 1977 release was whether “an entity issuing 
a security rating [is] the type of person referred to in Section 7 of the 
Securities Act of 1933 whose consent is required to be filed by the 
issuer of the security.”88 It sought comment regarding the potential costs 
or burdens associated with obtaining CRAs’ consent for the disclosure 
of ratings.89 The SEC also inquired about the impact that could result 
“from a rating entity being subject to Section 11 under the Securities Act 
of 1933, with respect to its rating being disclosed in a prospectus[.]”90 
Additionally, it sought comment on “additional disclosure concerning 
the nature of a rating and the manner in which it is obtained,” 
specifically when ratings are included in filed documents.91 Among the 
additional disclosure proposals was one that would require disclosure of 
“the fact that the agency was paid a fee for the rating,” offering an early 
glimpse into the conflict of interest issue.92 
The fifty-five comments in response to the 1977 release generally 
opposed CRA consent requirements under Section 7 and liability as 
experts under Section 11.93 It was argued that applying Section 7 and 11 
to CRAs would slow down the timetable of the registration process and 
would increase the cost of ratings due to the uncertain scope of CRA 
                                                                                                                 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 58,415. 
 86. Id. at 58,414. 
 87. Id. at 58,414 n.4. At this time, the term “investment grade” referred to a non-
convertible debt or preferred security that at least one NRSRO has rated within one of 
its four highest rating categories. 
 88. Id. at 58,415. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id. at 58,414. 
 93. See SEC 2009 Concept Release, supra note 55, at 7. 
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liability.94 The NRSROs in existence in 1977 also declared that they 
would decline to provide consent to be named in the registration 
statement if it became a requirement.95 
Four years later in 1981, the SEC formally announced its shift in 
policy, permitting the voluntary disclosure of credit ratings in 
registration statements.96 The 1981 release set forth two major 
proposals. The first was to amend the Securities Act of 1933, to “permit 
disclosure of security ratings of debt securities, convertible debt 
securities or preferred stock assigned by a rating organization in certain 
communications deemed not to be a prospectus.”97  
The second proposal would have eliminated the required consent of 
NRSROs under Section 7, and would have exempted an NRSRO from 
civil liability as an expert under Section 11 when its rating was used as 
part of a registration statement.98 
[The second proposal] would add a new subparagraph (g) to Rule 
436 under the Securities Act . . . to provide that a security rating is 
not a part of a registration statement prepared or certified by a person 
or a report or valuation prepared or certified by a person within the 
meaning of Sections 7 and 11 of the Securities Act.99 
The SEC noted several factors leading to this proposal.100 First, if 
NRSROs refused to provide consent then there would ultimately be zero 
disclosure of credit ratings, even if permitted by the SEC.101 As a result, 
436(g) was proposed by the SEC “in order to make its new policy 
position on disclosure of credit ratings meaningful.”102 Next, responses 
to the 1977 release stated that procuring acquiring agencies’ consent 
under Section 7 would prove to be troublesome and time-consuming.103 
A rating organization would not likely consent, until it could fully 
                                                                                                                 
 94. Id. at 7-8. 
 95. Id. at 8. 
 96. Disclosure of Security Ratings in Registration Statements, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,024, 
42,024 (proposed Aug. 18. 1981). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 42,024-25. 
 99. Id. at 42,024. 
 100. Id. at 42,027. 
 101. SEC 2009 Concept Release, supra note 55, at 8. 
 102. Id. at 8-9. 
 103. Disclosure of Security Ratings in Registration Statements, 46 Fed. Reg. 
42,024, 42,027 (proposed Aug. 18, 1981). 
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ensure that its rating was based on all of the information in the 
registration statement if at all.104 If Section 7 written consent became a 
requirement, NRSROs would have increased involvement with the 
content and timing of a registration statement, which “would inject the 
rating organization into the registration process as a participant, not as 
an objective evaluator, thus lessening its independence from the 
issuer.”105 Another reason for proposing 436(g) was that the prospect of 
liability under Section 11 would lead rating agencies to issue ratings 
solely on the basis of quantifiable data rather than informal subjective 
factors, lessening the quality of ratings.106 This change would be 
damaging to the ratings process.107 The uncertain scope of Section 11 
liability would also lead NRSROs to raise their fees, which would be 
detrimental to newer or smaller issuers of securities facing higher 
costs.108 The SEC believed it could circumvent these issues by 
permitting disclosure of ratings in registration statements without 
requiring agencies’ consent, which would give investors direct access to 
the ratings.109 The proposed exemptions would only apply to rating 
agencies who were NRSROs under the Net Capital Rule.110 
The SEC justified the proposed exemptions by noting that rating 
organizations could already be subject to liability under select anti-fraud 
provisions of the federal securities laws, and thus 436(g) would serve to 
further hold NRSROs to the highest professional standards.111 
Additionally, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 gave the SEC some 
jurisdiction over rating agencies.112 Section 206 of the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940 authorizes the SEC to “define and prescribe means 
reasonably designed to prevent, such acts, practices, and courses of 
                                                                                                                 
 104. Id. 
 105. See also id. at 42,028. “As previously discussed, the Commission is taking this 
action, in part, because it is concerned about the practical problems that were raised by 
the commentators, particularly the possible interference with the rating process and the 
possible difficulty in obtaining rating organization consents.” Id. 
 106. Id. at 42,027. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 42,028. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. At the time of the proposal for Rule 436(g), NRSROs were generally 
required to register as investment advisers. The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 
2006 provides an exclusion from the Advisers Act for NRSROs. 
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business as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.”113 Therefore, if 
improper issuance of security ratings would become a problem, the SEC 
believed that Section 206 would give it authority to regulate such 
behavior.114 
D. THE ADOPTION OF RULE 436(G) AND BEYOND 
In 1982, the SEC formally adopted several important proposals.115 
A majority of responses to the 1977 and 1981 proposals were in favor of 
permitting voluntary disclosure of credit ratings and an exemption for 
NRSROs from Sections 7 and 11 of the Securities Act.116 The 1982 
release affirmed the adoption of the Rule 436(g) exemption for 
NRSROs.117 
The Commission continues to believe that ratings should be 
permitted to be disclosed in Commission filings . . . and that it is 
appropriate to exempt NRSROs from Section 11 liability if their 
ratings are included in Securities Act registration statements. 
Accordingly, the Commission today is affirming its new policy and 
adopting the proposed amendments to Rules 436 and 134.118 
At that time, the organizations recognized as NRSROs under the 
Net Capital Rule were Standard & Poor’s Corporation, Moody’s 
Investor Services, Inc., Fitch Investors Services, and Duff and Phelps, 
Inc.119  
 Non-NRSROs were not afforded the privilege of exemption, and 
any disclosure of their ratings in a registration statement would require 
their written consent and could potentially expose them to civil liability 
as experts.120 The Commission acknowledged that several commentators 
                                                                                                                 
 113. Disclosure of Security Ratings in Registration Statements, 46 Fed. Reg. at 
42,028. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380, 11,380 
(proposed Mar. 16, 1982). 
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criticized the Net Capital Rule for lacking any specific definition of the 
NRSRO term and also for its lack of guidance on how to qualify as an 
NRSRO.121 The SEC responded by declaring that it was “not aware of 
any substantial burden being imposed on rating organizations that are 
not NRSROs due to any absence of guidance in this area.”122 
The 1982 release clarified that the voluntary disclosure of security 
ratings was not limited to only Securities Act registration statements, but 
also applied to certain Exchange Act of 1934 filings.123 Security ratings 
could also be included in tombstone advertisements.124 
The SEC then published some considerations for disclosing a 
security rating in a registration statement.125 The registrant should first 
consider disclosing every other publicly available ranking assigned by 
an NRSRO that substantially differs from the disclosed rating.126 A 
registrant should also consider providing additional information 
regarding the characteristics of security ratings, making clear the source 
of the rating so that investors can obtain more information.127 When a 
rating is included in a registration statement, but the rating changes prior 
to the effectiveness of the statement, a registrant should consider 
amending it to disclose the rating change.128 The SEC opted to include 
only a list of things that a registrant “should consider,” rather than 
establishing concrete disclosure requirements.129 
In 1986, the SEC proposed to extend the exemptions of 436(g) to 
include NRSRO ratings of money market funds.130 The policies of the 
1982 release did extend to preferred stock equity securities, but not other 
types of equity securities such as money market fund shares.131 
Therefore, it was proposed that exempting money market fund ratings 
from Section 7 and 11 of the Securities Act was a “logical extension” of 
                                                                                                                 
must furnish a consent and take on expert liability under the Securities Act if its rating 
is included in the registration statement and prospectus.’”). 
 121. Id. at 11,392 n.54. 
 122. Id. at 11,392. 
 123. Id.  
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 130. Disclosure of Security Ratings by Money Market Funds, 51 Fed. Reg. 9,838, 
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its action in adopting Rule 436(g).132 The proposal would permit a 
money market fund with an NRSRO rating to disclose that rating 
without obtaining the NRSRO’s consent before using it in a registration 
statement.133 The 1986 proposal was never put into action, and Rule 
436(g) was not amended to include money market fund ratings.134 
In 1994, the SEC published a proposal that would mandate the 
disclosure of security ratings in cases where a rating is obtained by or on 
behalf of an issuer.135 An issuer would also be required to discuss the 
scope of the rating and disclose any subsequent material changes to the 
security rating.136 The SEC’s 1994 proposal was intended to “improve 
the quality and timeliness of security ratings disclosures . . . in 
prospectuses and periodic reports, and to reduce the potential for market 
misunderstanding and confusion over the scope and meaning of security 
ratings.”137 The SEC felt compelled to propose mandatory disclosure 
requirements because the scope and meaning of security ratings had 
become more variable while disclosure requirements had remained the 
same.138 Until 1994, the SEC had not seen a “pressing need” for 
mandatory disclosure, but proposed it at that time because the securities 
market had evolved to include many more types of securities, such as 
complex mortgage and asset-backed securities and other structured 
financial instruments.139 Notwithstanding these market developments, 
the SEC had enacted few changes to its ratings disclosure policies.140 
The 1994 release also solicited comments on whether the SEC 
should continue to distinguish between NRSROs and Non-NRSROs for 
the purpose of Rule 436(g) exemptions.141 It also inquired as to whether 
Rule 436(g) should extend to Non-NRSROs, and whether the exemption 
for NRSROs should be rescinded completely.142 The SEC wanted to 
discourage “rating shopping,” whereby a company could avoid 
                                                                                                                 
 132. Id. at 9,839. 
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 135. Disclosure of Security Ratings, 59 Fed. Reg. 46,304, 46,304 (proposed Sept. 7, 
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disclosure of negative unsolicited ratings while only disclosing 
favorable solicited ratings.143 The Commission also sought comments 
regarding the scope of information that should be disclosed alongside a 
security rating, and offered several of its own proposals to help remedy 
any potential investor confusion.144 
Comments in response to the 1994 proposal generally opposed the 
exposure of NRSROs and CRAs to Section 11 liability under the 
Securities Act.145 Among the commentators were Moody’s and Fitch 
Investors Service, who defended security ratings as mere “expressions 
of opinion about risk,” alleging that Section 11 liability would violate 
the First Amendment rights of NRSROs.146 They added that the potential 
for liability could reduce or even eliminate the disclosure of security 
ratings.147 The SEC ultimately did not act on its 1994 proposals.148 
In 2002, months after the corporate giant Enron declared 
bankruptcy, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs held 
various hearings regarding the corporation’s finances.149 It subsequently 
produced a detailed report, urging “increased oversight for these rating 
agencies in order to ensure that the public’s trust in these firms is well-
placed.”150 Since the term “NRSRO” appeared in 1975, the Committee 
found that no less than eight federal statutes, forty-seven federal 
regulations, and over one hundred state laws and regulations made 
benchmark references to NRSROs.151 While they were generally related 
to banking and securities, other regulations making reference to 
NRSROs dealt with education, transportation and even 
telecommunications.152 
A 2005 SEC proposal sought to define the term NRSRO in order to 
recognize certain agencies that the SEC could rely on in formulating its 
regulations.153 However, due to concerns from Congress that the 
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Reg. 21,306, 21,310 (proposed Apr. 25, 2005); Mulligan, supra note 30, at 1285. 
1084 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
Commission lacked the specific authority to oversee the credit rating 
industry in this manner, the 2005 proposal was never adopted.154 
Proposals were also made in 2008 to amend Rule 436(g),155 and in 
2009 to rescind 436(g),156 discussed in the sections below. 
1. The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 
In the wake of the economic collapse of numerous large and well-
rated companies, Congress enacted The Credit Rating Agency Reform 
Act of 2006.157 The preamble to the Act expresses its goal, “[t]o improve 
ratings quality for the protection of investors and in the public interest 
by fostering accountability, transparency, and competition in the credit 
rating agency industry.”158 
The Act finally offered credit rating agencies the ability to ascend 
to NRSRO status by registering with the SEC and providing certain 
information.159 The required information includes statistics regarding 
short and long-term performance, procedures used to determine credit 
ratings, policies implemented by the applicant to prevent the misuse of 
nonpublic information, and whether the applicant has procedures in 
place for addressing conflicts of interest.160 To qualify, a CRA must be 
in business for at least three years preceding its application.161 The Act 
gives the SEC “exclusive authority to enforce the provisions” regarding 
NRSROs,162 and allows it to amend or review the regulations in 
furtherance of the objectives of the Act.163 
The ability to register with the SEC would allow more agencies to 
earn the NRSRO designation, consequently fostering increased 
competition in the ratings industry.164 Disclosure requirements were set 
                                                                                                                 
 154. Mulligan, supra note 30, at 1286. 
 155. Security Ratings, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,106, 40,114 (proposed July 11, 2008). 
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in order to increase transparency, which “allows investors to develop 
informed opinions and facilitates accountability.”165 
The Act also sets forth several provisions regarding the conflict of 
interest issue.166 NRSROs were required to enact policies for eliminating 
potential conflicts of interest: 
Each nationally recognized statistical rating organization shall 
establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures 
reasonably designed, taking into consideration the nature of the 
business of such nationally recognized statistical rating organization 
and affiliated persons and affiliated companies thereof, to address 
and manage any conflicts of interest that can arise from such 
business.167 
The SEC was given the authority to issue the final rules regarding 
the management and disclosure of conflicts of interest.168 Types of 
conflicts that the SEC could regulate include the manner in which an 
NRSRO is paid by the issuer for ratings, NRSROs’ providing advisory 
and consulting services to issuers, and close business and financial 
relationships with issuers or their affiliates.169 It is worth noting that 
under the Act, NRSROs must only abide by their own set of procedures 
and methodologies that they develop, and the SEC is prohibited from 
regulating the actual procedures or methodologies of any agency.170 
A final provision in the Act calls for a study to be conducted in 
order to identify how the Act impacts the quality of credit ratings, 
financial markets, competition among rating agencies, the NRSRO 
                                                                                                                 
 165. Id. The author makes several noteworthy assertions about the scope of the 
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, and the potential for achieving its 
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registration process, and conflicts of interest by NRSROs.171 This 
provision delegated the study to the Comptroller General of the United 
States, and requires the report to be submitted within three to four years 
of the enactment of the Act.172 
2. Proposals in 2008 and 2009 
In 2008, the SEC simultaneously published three releases 
proposing changes to security ratings and NRSROs.173 The proposals 
were set forth in furtherance of the Act.174 
In its June 16 release, the SEC proposed two initiatives targeted at 
reducing conflicts of interest, increasing competition among rating 
agencies, and improving investors’ understanding of the risks associated 
with structured finance products.175 The rulemaking initiatives addressed 
“concerns about the integrity of the credit rating procedures . . . of 
NRSROs in light of the role they played in determining the security 
ratings for securities that were the subject of the recent turmoil in the 
credit markets.”176 
In its July 11 release, the SEC contemplated whether its inclusion 
of security rating requirements in many of its forms and rules had 
effectively affixed an “official seal of approval” on the use of security 
ratings.177 It believed that this sort of approval was undermining the 
quality of investors’ own analysis and due diligence, consequently 
leading to undue reliance on security ratings issued by NRSROs.178 Prior 
to this proposal, eligible issuers could only use Short Forms S-3 and F-3 
for asset-backed securities if they met certain rating requirements, 
specifically if the securities were rated “investment grade” by 
NRSROs.179 In an attempt to reduce reliance on credit ratings, the SEC 
proposed new requirements for Short Form S-3 and F-3, which were 
based on a minimum denomination amount rather than security 
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ratings.180 Under the proposal, an issuer utilizing Short Forms S-3 and F-
3 to register primary offerings of non-convertible securities for cash 
could only do so if it has issued over $1 billion in non-convertible 
securities for cash, as of sixty days prior to filing the registration 
statement.181 The SEC also sought comment on whether there exists an 
alternative definition of “investment grade debt securities” that did not 
incorporate NRSRO ratings and would still adequately relate short-form 
registration to the recognition of a widespread marketplace following.182 
The SEC ultimately did not act on its 2008 proposals.183 
As the significance of credit ratings increased, the SEC sought to 
provide more protection to investors by contemplating the rescission of 
Rule 436(g) in 2009.184 It was concerned that its original bases for 
distinguishing between NRSROs and Non-NRSROs with regard to 
Section 11 liability were no longer sufficient.185 
[W]e are now exploring whether Rule 436(g) is still appropriate in 
light of the growth and development of the credit rating industry and 
investors’ use of credit ratings. We are mindful of the potential 
significant impact that rescinding Rule 436(g) could have on 
registrants, NRSROs and other credit rating agencies, investors and 
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Section 11 of the Securities Act imposes liability on various parties who are involved 
in the preparation of registration statements filed under the Securities Act. Section 11 
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purporting to be made on his or her authority contained an untrue statement of 
material fact or omitted to state a material fact necessary to make the statements 
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the registration statement became effective, that the statements in the registration 
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consented to be named in the registration statement (the “experts’ defense”). 
Id. at 5. 
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the financial markets in general, and we seek comment on any 
burdens or benefits that may result.186 
The SEC’s scrutiny of Rule 436(g) was based on four primary 
factors.187 First, it believed that the underlying rationale behind Rule 
436(g) was no longer sufficient to continue to allow NRSROs to be 
exempt from Section 11 in light of its recent mandatory disclosure 
requirements.188 When the SEC first permitted voluntary disclosure of 
security ratings in registration statements in the 1980s, it believed that 
eliminating the Section 7 consent and Section 11 liability requirements 
for NRSROs would effectively promote the use of security ratings, 
thereby making its policy more meaningful.189 If the SEC were to adopt 
its 2008 proposals mandating the disclosure of security ratings, it would 
“no longer need to provide a means to encourage disclosure about credit 
ratings,” making the rationale of 436(g) inapplicable.190 Another 
underlying reason for enacting 436(g) was that CRAs were already 
subject to liability under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, which the 
SEC believed would provide sufficient investor protection against faulty 
security ratings.191 Since the Act provides an exemption for NRSROs 
from the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, this protection also no longer 
applies.192 
The second reason for proposing the rescission of 436(g) was the 
contention that investors rely on credit rating agencies as experts when 
their ratings are used to sell securities, and as such it could be 
appropriate to apply the SEC’s liability scheme for experts onto 
NRSROs.193 “In our view, NRSROs represent themselves to registrants 
and investors as experts at analyzing credit and risk,” thus the SEC felt 
that rating agencies should be treated as experts.194 Although NRSROs 
generally believe that their ratings are mere “opinions” on risk, the SEC 
notes that investors also rely on the opinions of other professionals, and 
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those opinions are still subject to Section 7 and 11 of the Securities 
Act.195 If NRSROs and CRAs are issuing expert opinions, the SEC saw 
no reason why they should not be treated as experts under the Securities 
Act.196 
The third reason given for potentially repealing 436(g) was that 
exposure to the risk of liability under Section 11 would foster an 
improvement in the quality of credit ratings and enhance NRSROs’ 
accountability.197 Eliminating the protective shield of Rule 436(g) would 
encourage NRSROs and CRAs to improve the quality of their ratings in 
order to reduce their potential liability.198 
The Commission’s final reason was that the distinction between 
NRSROs and Non-NRSROs could create “competitive disadvantages” 
and lead to high barriers of entry into the credit ratings industry.199 Non-
NRSROs would likely face higher costs than NRSROs because of their 
potential risk for liability.200 The Commission notes that despite 
NRSROs’ past unwillingness to be subject to liability, the core of the 
CRA business model remains to be the issuance of credit ratings.201 Due 
to their importance to NRSRO revenues, it is unlikely that agencies 
would cease to issue credit ratings in the face of potential liability.202 
 
III. THE CONTROVERSIAL ROLE OF RATING  
AGENCIES IN GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS 
 
As self-established authorities on creditworthiness, both the 
accurate and inaccurate opinions of credit rating agencies may be 
thought of too highly by investors, notably when dealing with complex 
structured financial products.203 After the United States economic 
                                                                                                                 
 195. Id. at 15-16. Examples of other professional opinions that investors rely on 
include legal opinions, valuation opinions, fairness opinions, and audit reports. 
 196. Id. at 16. 
 197. Id. at 16. 
 198. SEC 2009 Concept Release, supra note 55, at 16. The Commission 
acknowledged that the potential for liability could undermine competition in the credit 
ratings industry because certain agencies may exit the industry to avoid liability, and 
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Section 11 liability. 
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 201. Id. at 19. 
 202. See id. 
 203. See Lynch, supra note 10, at 234, 284-85.  
1090 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
collapse of 2007-2008, the excessive packaging and sale of sub-prime 
mortgages was largely to blame.204 This occurrence and its subsequent 
economic impact left many questions to be answered, including why so 
many investors chose to invest in our housing market during a housing 
bubble.205 While some of the blame for the sub-prime mortgage crisis 
lies with uninformed homeowners and unethical loan originators who 
gave out mortgages to those who lacked the creditworthiness to make 
timely payments, the major CRAs in America also played a large role in 
the crisis.206 The heavy investment in structured financial instruments 
such as mortgage-backed securities can be traced back, in part, to the 
improper ratings given to those securities by Moody’s, Standard and 
Poor’s, and Fitch Ratings.207 “Investor appetites” for mortgage-backed 
securities and other collateralized debt obligations were fueled by 
NRSROs, whose inflated ratings characterized certain investments as 
less risky than they really were.208 As investor reliance on credit ratings 
increased, the level of due diligence and individual analysis of credit 
risks decreased, and credit ratings soon became substitutes—rather than 
supplements—for internal creditworthiness analysis.209 
Performance of top-rated structured securities steadily decreased, 
prompting ratings downgrades for the complex financial instruments.210 
Unfortunately for investors, it was too late. The delayed timing of the 
rating agencies in downgrading certain ratings raised several questions 
about the overall accuracy and integrity of the credit rating process.211 
The sub-prime mortgage crisis revealed only a glimpse of the powerful 
and influential role of rating agencies in government and business.212 
Further cementing the hegemonic role of CRAs in the global 
economy is the value of the services they provide to both investors and 
securities issuers.213 For example, investors with limited access to 
research and analytical tools rely heavily on CRAs for making credit 
                                                                                                                 
 204. See id. at 231, 258. 
 205. Id. at 233. 
 206. Id. at 233-34. 
 207. Id. at 234. 
 208. Lynch, supra note 10, at 234. 
 209. Id. 
 210. SEC SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 11, at 2. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Lynch, supra note 10, at 236. 
 213. Id. at 240-41. 
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evaluations in an efficient manner.214 When investors need not use their 
own energy, time, and money to research every investment opportunity, 
efficiency increases and overall costs of investing decreases.215 
Additionally, CRAs are given access to nonpublic information 
unavailable to most investors, contributing to their value in the 
investment community.216 An issuer of securities that have been rated by 
a major CRA also benefits through lower costs of capital.217 An investor 
considering a purchase of debt securities would be more inclined to do 
so if the securities were rated, because the investor would not be 
burdened with having to fully evaluate their creditworthiness.218 This 
becomes particularly true when the securities involved are of a complex 
nature, such as mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt 
obligations.219 
A. CONFLICT OF INTEREST ISSUE 
The continuing chain of financial scandals as of late has brought 
significant attention to conflicts of interest between credit rating 
agencies and securities issuers.220 The process of issuers paying agencies 
for their own ratings creates an inherent conflict of interest.221 This 
conflict is aggravated by the fact that CRAs typically offer consulting 
services to issuers on how to maintain or improve their ratings.222 
Despite the inherent flaws in the issuer-pays model, CRAs claim that 
they manage their conflicts of interest through internal processes.223 
On its face, the close-contact relationship between rating agencies 
and issuers allows the agencies to make the most accurate judgments in 
calculating ratings while also ensuring that the issuer client is 
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satisfied.224 “But, as with a hostage that eventually sympathizes with his 
or her captors, with close contact comes the potential for an issuer to 
cloud the judgment of a CRA.”225 The ability of issuers to persuade 
CRAs to give them favorable ratings—or delay ratings downgrades—
will be strong as long as issuers continue to pay for their own ratings.226 
The potential for conflicts of interest is exacerbated by the 
complexity of structured financial products such as collateralized debt 
obligations and residential mortgage-backed securities.227 In the process 
of rating a traditional financial instrument, an issuer of securities has 
little room to improve its creditworthiness and risk characteristics prior 
to being rated.228 However, in the arena of structured finance, rating 
agencies play an active role in shaping the architecture of structured 
products.229 “In practice, [issuers] will routinely use [CRAs’] publicly 
available models to pre-structure deals and subsequently engage in a 
process that is ‘iterative and interactive,’ informing the issuer of the 
requirements to attain desired ratings in different tranches and largely 
defining the requirements of the structures to achieve target ratings.”230  
Typically, an issuer will propose certain structures of seniority within 
each tranche with the objective of achieving a favorable credit rating.231 
The development of models for rating collateralized debt obligations 
allowed issuers to reconfigure assets that were previously rated below 
investment grade into tranches offering higher yields at less of a credit 
risk.232 The rating agency, now playing an advisory role, indicates to the 
issuer whether the assets and structures will attain favorable ratings 
                                                                                                                 
 224. Milosz Gudzowski, Comment, Mortgage Credit Ratings and the Financial 
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pursuant to the agency’s methodologies.233 This immerses rating 
agencies into the structuring process of a deal, leaving an open door for 
conflicts of interest.234 
Given the complexity of these financial instruments, the CRAs’ 
role in assessing the creditworthiness at each level is essential to the sale 
and distribution of the financial instruments.235 A favorable rating seems 
to dictate how marketable a given structure will be to investors, further 
increasing market reliance on credit ratings.236 Therefore, it could be 
said that an agency’s rating is “essential” to the issuer’s ability to sell its 
assets.237 With the balance of power in favor of CRAs, which are in a 
position to influence an issuer’s overall ability to sell securities, the need 
for objective ratings becomes even more apparent.238 
Conflicts of interest can occur throughout the ratings process from 
beginning to end.239 For example, below are a few “pressure points” in 
the process that are susceptible to such conflicts: 
At the initial contact between the issuer and/or its investment bank in 
soliciting a rating. In the application by the issuer of the agency’s 
rating model and assessment of an issue’s rating-sensitivity to 
changes in the structure of the offering and discussions with agency 
staff. 
During meetings between the agency’s staff and corporate 
management of government officials and the assembly of both 
public and private information. 
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 234. Id. at 13. 
 235. Id. at 14. 
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 237. Mason & Rosner, supra note 227, at 14. Mason & Rosner question whether the 
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During the preparation of a recommendation to the rating committee, 
and during the committee meeting leading to the rating to be 
assigned.                                                                      
 
During the comment period made available to the issuer between the 
preliminary assignment of a rating and its publication. Following 
rating reviews which place an issuer on a “watch list” for possible 
re-rating—usually negative, stable or positive—after there has been 
an unexpected material change in the issuer’s fundamentals and 
announcement that a rating review is in process.240 
 
In the ordinary course of business, other key sources of conflicts of 
interest at the individual level include: ownership of securities by CRA 
analysts who participate in the ratings process for those securities; 
serving as directors, officers, or employees at entities they rate; 
maintaining business relations that are beyond the scope of ordinary 
business; receiving gifts from issuers who are subject to a CRA’s rating; 
and CRA compensation contingent on revenues generated from debt 
issuers subject to a CRA’s rating.241 At the credit rating agency level, 
conflict of interest sources include: CRA affiliation with the issuer or 
underwriter of securities; rendering ancillary services to rated entities; 
and issuer payments to CRAs for providing ratings under an issuer-paid  
business model.242 
1.  Conflicts of Interest and Reputation 
How is the reputation of the major rating agencies affected by 
conflicts of interest? NRSROs have consistently cited the importance of 
their business reputation as a key incentive for avoiding conflicts of 
interest.243 Disciplinary action against a rating agency by the SEC could 
severely impair the ability of the agency to attain future business and 
revenue.244 If a CRA is deemed to have violated legal or professional 
standards, serious doubt would be cast on the credibility of its past and 
future ratings.245 Further, in a global economy where the name of a 
rating agency signifies the quality of its ratings, violations of conflicts of 
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interest “destroy the perceived value of having a rating from the agency 
that granted it.”246 Moody’s has stated that its success is contingent upon 
maintaining its professional reputation and coveted brand name.247 
Another reputation-related factor is that misleading ratings would entice 
securities issuers to seek ratings from competitors.248 Investors would 
discount the value of credit ratings issued by any CRA with a reputation 
for bias and seek out more CRAs.249 
Notwithstanding the discussion above, the high barriers to entry in 
the credit ratings industry and the “two-rating norm” in many markets 
diminish the significance of reputation as an incentive against conflicts 
of interest because there is not as much competition between the 
firms.250 The two-rating norm describes the typical practice of obtaining 
ratings from two different agencies for each issue.251 Since this entails 
that the first two rating agencies need not compete against one another, 
the CRA market has been said to be a “partner monopoly” consisting of 
Moody’s and S&P.252 The Credit Rating Reform Act of 2006 attempted 
to reduce the barriers of entry by announcing procedures for achieving 
NRSRO status.253 NRSRO designation can be seen as a barrier, given 
that only NRSRO-issued ratings carry official weight with the SEC.254 
                                                                                                                 
 246. SMITH & WALTER, supra note 239, at 310. 
 247. Id. at 311. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Stephane Rousseau, Enhancing the Accountability of Credit Rating Agencies: 
The Case for a Disclosure-Based Approach, 51 MCGILL L.J. 617, 637-38 (2006). 
 250. See John Patrick Hunt, Credit Rating Agencies and the “Worldwide Credit 
Crisis”: The Limits of Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposal for 
Improvement, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 109, 131-33 (2009). 
 251. See id. at 132. 
 252. Id.; see also Letter from Sean J. Egan & W. Bruce Jones, Egan-Jones Ratings 
Co. to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Nov. 10, 2002), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/credrate/eganjones2.htm.  
  The phrase “partner monopoly” is explained in terms of the noncompetitive 
relationship between Moody’s and S&P. In the case of most US corporate ratings and 
an increasing number of structured finance transactions, S&P and Moody’s are the only 
firms used. The industry could more accurately be described as a “partner monopoly,” a 
term used by U.S. Department of Justice personnel. A partner monopoly differs from an 
oligopoly in the sense that the two firms share the market whereby the gain in revenues 
by one firm does not reduce the revenues of the second firm. Since two ratings are 
normally needed for the issuance of bonds, the gains of Moody’s do not come at the 
expense of S&P and vice versa. Id. 
 253. Hunt, supra note 250, at 133-34. 
 254. Id. 
1096 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
The SEC has since continued its attempt to foster competition in the 
ratings agency,255 however it remains clear that the big three firms are 
here to stay. 
In the arena of structured financial instruments, reputation plays 
even less of a role because they have been rated by CRAs for a short 
amount of time relative to more traditional debt instruments.256 As such, 
investors may not necessarily associate imperfect ratings for CDOs with 
the performance of traditional securities.257 Since these structured 
products are so complex, most investors lack the ability to 
independently value them to determine their true creditworthiness, 
further clouding their judgment of a CRA’s reputation.258 
2. SEC Rule 17g-5 
The SEC promulgated Conflicts of Interest Rule, 17 C.F.R.              
§ 240.17g-5 (2012) (“Rule 17g-5”) to further control conflicts of interest 
within CRAs.259 Enhanced disclosure is at the root of Rule 17g-5, which 
prohibits NRSROs from some conflicts of interest unless they are 
disclosed,260 expressly prohibits other conflicts,261 and requires rating 
agencies to establish, maintain, and enforce procedures to address such 
conflicts.262 
Provisions relating to the maintenance of an internet website: Rule 
17g-5 utilizes the free flow of information made possible by the internet 
in order to ensure full disclosure of conflicts of interest as well as 
material non-public information that is useful to other rating agencies 
and the SEC.263 The complexity of structured debt securities led the SEC 
to set more stringent disclosure requirements for credit ratings, including 
requiring NRSROs to maintain a password-protected website detailing 
the information provided by issuers, sponsors, or underwriters to the 
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CRAs.264 The internet website provisions apply to NRSROs that rate 
securities or money market instruments issued by an asset pool or as part 
of asset-backed or mortgage-backed securities that are paid for by the 
issuer.265 This is significant because the SEC formally recognizes the 
inherent conflicts of the “issuer-pays” business model that has been 
utilized by the major rating agencies for decades.266 
The requisite information to be made available on the website 
includes a list of each security for which a CRA is in the process of 
generating an initial credit rating, details regarding the type of security, 
the name of the issuer, the dates involved in the rating process, and the 
specific internet address where the information above can be 
accessed.267 More specifically, Rule 17g-5(a)(iii)(C) requires the issuer, 
sponsor, or underwriter to: 
Post . . . all information the issuer, sponsor, or underwriter provides 
to the [NRSRO], or contracts with a third party to provide to the 
[NRSRO], for the purpose of determining the initial credit rating for 
the security . . . including information about the characteristics of the 
assets underlying or referenced by the security . . . and the legal 
structure of the security . . . at the same time such information is 
provided to the [NRSRO]; and Post . . . all information the issuer, 
sponsor, or underwriter provides to the [NRSRO] . . . for the purpose 
of undertaking credit rating surveillance on the security . . . including 
information about the characteristics and performance of the assets 
underlying or referenced by the security . . . at the same time such 
information is provided to the [NRSRO].268 
Provisions relating to certified access to the internet website: The 
NRSRO must provide free and unlimited access to the website to any 
other NRSRO which signs a certification stating that the information 
will be kept confidential and treated as material nonpublic information, 
addressing security concerns.269 In order to gain website access via 
certification, the NRSRO providing the certification must have 
“[d]etermined and maintained credit ratings for at least 10% of the 
issued securities . . . for which it accessed information . . . in the 
calendar year prior to the year covered by the certification, if it accessed 
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such information for 10 or more issued securities or money market 
instruments.”270 Alternatively, a certification may indicate that the 
NRSRO providing the certification has not accessed the information ten 
or more times in the recently ended calendar year.271 This basically 
means that NRSROs who are given access to this information are either 
constantly using it to rate securities, or barely using it at all. 
In addition to requiring certification from other NRSROs, a rating 
agency must also seek certain written representations from the issuers of 
the securities under Rule 17g-5.272 Each issuer, sponsor, or underwriter 
of the securities must furnish the NRSRO with a written representation 
that it will present the information on the website in a manner that 
designates which information can be relied upon in making 
creditworthiness assessments.273 The issuer must also indicate that it will 
provide access to the password-protected website to any NRSRO 
meeting the above certification requirements.274 
Provisions regarding types of conflicts that must be disclosed: Rule 
17g-5(b) enumerates nine specific conflicts of interest which are 
prohibited unless they are disclosed.275 A CRA must disclose when it 
has been paid by issuers, underwriters, or obligors to determine credit 
ratings of securities or money market instruments.276 A CRA must also 
disclose whether it is being paid for additional services beyond normal 
credit rating determinations.277 Payments to CRAs for subscriptions to 
access or receive credit ratings by persons who may use the ratings to 
comply with and obtain benefits or relief under statutes and regulations 
utilizing the term “nationally recognized statistical rating organization” 
must be disclosed.278 The same is true where the persons purchasing the 
subscriptions may own investments or have entered into transactions 
that could be impacted by a specific CRA’s credit rating.279 Full conflict 
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disclosure is also required where a credit rating has been set forth for a 
security issued by an asset pool or as part of any ABS or MBS 
transaction which was paid for by the issuer, sponsor, or underwriter.280 
Ownership of securities rated by an NRSRO by persons within the 
NRSRO is also prohibited unless disclosed.281 Rule 17g-5 defines 
“person within an NRSRO” as “a nationally recognized statistical rating 
organization, its credit rating affiliates identified on Form NRSRO, and 
any partner, officer, director, branch manager, and employee of the 
[NRSRO] or its credit rating affiliates (or any person occupying a 
similar status or performing similar functions).”282 These provisions 
target the close interpersonal relationships that can arise between 
NRSROs and issuers, which are a breeding ground for conflicts of 
interest. For example, direct ownership interests in issuers, obligors, and 
the securities themselves by persons within the NRSRO are a listed 
conflict of interest.283 Further, relationships beyond an “arms length 
ordinary course of business relationship” between NRSRO employees 
and issuers subject to a credit rating by the NRSRO are conflicts.284 A 
person associated with an NRSRO who is a broker or dealer in the 
business of underwriting securities must also disclose that fact.285 A final 
catch-all provision is listed as the tenth enumerated conflict within this 
category, and requires disclosure of any other conflict of interest that is 
material to the NRSRO.286 
Provisions regarding types of conflicts that are absolutely 
prohibited: While some NRSRO conflicts are permissible if disclosed, 
those listed under Rule 17g-5(c) are expressly prohibited.287 An NRSRO 
cannot issue or maintain a credit rating that has been solicited by a 
person that has provided 10% (or greater) of the NRSRO’s total net 
revenue in the most recently ended fiscal year.288 This would prevent an 
issuer from being able to easily solicit favorable ratings for securities on 
                                                                                                                 
 280.  Id. § 240.17g-5(b)(9). 
 281.  Id. § 240.17g-5(b)(6). 
 282.  Id. § 240.17g-5(d). 
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 287. Id. § 240.17g-5(c). 
 288. Id. § 240.17g-5(c)(1). 
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the basis of generating a large portion of the NRSRO’s total revenue. It 
is also prohibited to issue or maintain a credit rating to a person 
(excluding sovereign nations) where the NRSRO, including any analysts 
who participated in determining the rating or were responsible for 
approving it, directly owns securities or other interests in the person 
subject to the credit rating.289 Ownership of a security can directly skew 
analysts’ objectivity when making determinations that can favorably or 
adversely impact the security’s value.290 Further, issuing ratings where a 
credit analyst—or someone responsible for approving ratings—serves as 
an officer or director of the entity being rated is not permitted.291 
NRSROs are precluded from issuing ratings with respect to any person 
associated with the NRSRO292 as the market derives little value from 
credit ratings issued by agencies having a direct affiliation with 
underwriters or issuers. 
Where an NRSRO or a person associated with it has “made 
recommendations to the obligor or the issuer, underwriter, or sponsor of 
the security about the corporate or legal structure, assets, liabilities, or 
activities of the obligor or issuer of the security,” the NRSRO may not 
issue or maintain a credit rating for that obligor or security.293 This 
reflects belief by the SEC that an NRSRO cannot maintain an objective 
viewpoint when it essentially rates its own work.294 Rule 17g-5(c) also 
forbids a rating from being issued where the same person is involved in 
both the credit rating determination process and the fee negotiation 
process within the NRSRO.295 This is intended to keep the people who 
negotiate fees insulated from those who are directly involved in the 
rating process, to defeat the possibility of giving more favorable 
treatment to certain high-paying issuers.296 Lastly, anyone within an 
NRSRO involved in the determination, monitoring, or approval of a 
credit rating is forbidden from receiving gifts exceeding $25.00, 
                                                                                                                 
 289.  Id. § 240.17g-5(c)(2). 
 290. See id. Indeed, it is easy to see how ownership of a security would provide a 
financial incentive for inflating its credit rating. 
 291.  Id. § 240.17g-5(c)(4). 
 292.  Id. § 240.17g-5(c)(3). 
 293.  Id. § 240.17g-5(c)(5). 
 294. Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-59342, 74 Fed. Reg. 6,456, 6,465 (Feb. 9, 
2009). 
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including entertainment, from the obligor, issuer, underwriter, or 
sponsor of the securities being rated.297 The SEC intended here to target 
any potential undue influence arising from the exchange of gifts 
between issuers and rating agency analysts.298 
Responses to Rule 17g-5: Throughout the process of creating Rule 
17g-5, the SEC received several responses to its proposals, most 
generally supporting the disclosure requirements.299 One commenter 
noted that these rules created a “level playing field” for the CRAs.300 
Another supporter believed that the heightened levels of disclosure 
would foster “true competition” in the industry.301 Regarding the 
password protected internet website, one commenter stated that the 
requirements for NRSROs to maintain the website are not unduly 
burdensome on the agencies.302 On the issue of whether the information 
on the NRSRO website would be sufficient to timely notify other 
NRSROs that the rating process has begun, one commenter suggested 
that the SEC requires non-hired NRSROs to be notified of new deals by 
e-mail, or that the Commission initiates a pilot project aimed at getting 
the information out to the non-hired NRSROs.303 The Commission did 
not find this necessary, arguing that monitoring such a website would be 
simple and not overly time-consuming for non-hired NRSROs.304 
Numerous comments also disfavored the Rule 17g-5 proposals. 
One commenter noted that these elevated disclosure requirements would 
impose heavy costs on small originators of structured debt instruments, 
causing them to abandon that market.305 Another commenter stated that 
requiring such great disclosure creates an incentive for issuers to engage 
in ratings shopping, choosing the NRSRO that would demand the least 
amount of information in the rating process.306 However, the SEC takes 
the view that its initiatives would remedy “ratings shopping by exposing 
                                                                                                                 
 297. Id. 
 298. Bai, supra note 241, at 276. 
 299. Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release 
No. 34-61050, 74 Fed. Reg. 63,832, 63,843 (Dec. 4, 2009) [hereinafter Final NRSRO 
Rules]. 
 300. Id. (quoting Riskmetrics Statement). 
 301. Id. (quoting Egan-Jones Statement). 
 302. Id. at 63,845 (quoting ABA Committee letter). 
 303. Id. (citing DBRS letter). 
 304. Id, at 63,846. 
 305. Id. at 63,843 (citing R&I letter). 
 306. Id. (citing Moody’s letter). 
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an NRSRO that employed less conservative rating methodologies in 
order to gain business.”307 Further, the SEC proposals were believed to 
mitigate the potential effects of rating shopping, because non-hired 
NRSROs can nonetheless issue their own credit ratings.308 
The SEC acknowledges that the nonpublic nature of certain 
information regarding structured finance products often results in a 
rating from only one or two NRSROs.309 To combat this, Rule 17g-5 and 
its amendments are designed to make certain information more available 
to other NRSROs, which can provide a check on conflicts of interest and 
increase transparency.310 By increasing the available credit ratings for a 
security, users are given more opinions on its creditworthiness.311 
Further, the SEC notes that “opening up the rating process to more 
NRSROs will make it easier for the hired NRSRO to resist [pressure 
from issuers] by increasing the likelihood that any steps taken to 
inappropriately favor the arranger could be exposed to the market 
through credit ratings issued by other NRSROs.”312 
IV. ACCOUNTABILITY OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 
A. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AS A DEFENSE 
1. Introduction 
Can a complex credit rating for a structured debt instrument 
calculated using advanced algorithms and methodologies be likened to a 
restaurant review in a newspaper? How about an editorial column? The 
major CRAs seem to think so.313 
Faced with lawsuits by disgruntled investors seeking redress, major 
CRAs employ the shield of the First Amendment to defend claims of 
responsibility for losses and fraud.314 Standard & Poor’s, Fitch, and 
Moody’s each awarded the best possible ratings to billions of dollars of 
structured debt products that tanked along with the collapse of the 
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 309. Id. at 63,844. 
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United States housing market.315 Since the collapse, major CRAs have 
had to explain why the debt of companies like Lehman Brothers and 
A.I.G. were given “the Wall Street equivalent of gold stars” prior to the 
collapse of Lehman and the rescue of A.I.G.316 The skepticism toward 
misappropriated ratings dates further back, like in 2001, when NRSROs 
came under fire for delaying their recognition of Enron’s 
creditworthiness deterioration.317 Investors were never given an early 
warning and by waiting to act until the company’s bond value fell hard 
and fast, NRSROs failed to properly anticipate Enron’s financial 
issues.318 
The Supreme Court of the United States has yet to specifically 
address whether credit ratings are protected speech pursuant to the First 
Amendment.319 However, the Court offered some insight on the First 
Amendment issue in the case of Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss.320 
In Greenmoss, a defamation suit was brought on the basis of a false 
credit report.321 The central issue was whether the defamatory statements 
were a matter of public concern, which would raise the requisite 
standard of proof to actual malice.322 For matters of public concern, a 
plaintiff in a defamation suit must prove the defendant’s “knowledge of 
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth” in order to meet the actual 
malice standard.323 The Court in Greenmoss looked to the “content, 
form, and context” of the speech at issue, holding that the report was not 
a matter of public concern, and would not receive constitutional speech 
protection.324 The report was available to only five subscribers and 
targeted a limited audience, factors which more resembled private 
speech in the Court’s view.325 Thus, when ratings are considered public 
in nature, the “actual malice” standard will be applied against the 
CRAs.326 Moody’s has stated that stripping First Amendment protection 
                                                                                                                 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Covitz & Harrison, supra note 220, at 3. 
 318. Id. at 4. 
 319. Partnoy, supra 3, at 59,85.  
 320. 472 U.S. 749 (1985). 
 321. Id. at 751-52. 
 322. Id. at 751. 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. at 761, 763. 
 325. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 762. 
 326. In re Pan Am Corp., 161 B.R. 577, 583-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
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from CRAs would impose damage on the financial service markets, 
emphasizing that credit ratings are matters of public concern.327 Some 
courts have deemed credit ratings matters of public concern on the based 
on the increasing role of corporate debt in the stability of financial 
markets.328 
 
2. Rating Agencies’ Arguments for  
Freedom of Speech Protection 
 
NRSROs contend that just as a journalist’s expression of his or her 
opinion is protected speech under the First Amendment, their credit 
ratings are also opinions entitled to the same protection.329 They have 
likened themselves to newspapers, because they too serve the public by 
“formulat[ing] opinions about those issuers and securities and broadly 
disseminat[ing] those opinions, which are of concern to the public.”330 
They say this to receive the highest free speech standard of actual 
malice, requiring proof that a defendant acted “with knowledge that the 
statement was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was false or 
not.”331 Floyd Abrams, a famous First Amendment lawyer hired to 
defend S&P, stated that “the major similarity here is that both the 
newspaper and S&P are offering opinions on matters that people can 
and do disagree about.”332 In defense of allegations of fraud and false 
misrepresentation against S&P, Abrams contends that the law protects 
forward-looking statements so long as the NRSRO truly believed its 
own ratings.333 Again relying on the analogy to editorials, Abrams 
claims that you cannot sue economists or meteorologists making 
predictions for the future, therefore you should not be able to sue an 
NRSRO, “[e]ven if those ratings are wrong, or the company did a lousy 
job, you can’t bring a lawsuit against someone for offering forward-
looking predictions.”334 
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Rating agencies have successfully argued that investor reliance on 
their credit ratings is unreasonable.335 They have been insistent that 
ratings are “not a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold any [securities] 
and may be subject to revision or withdrawal at any time,” a disclaimer 
which is often attached to ratings.336 The reliance argument is essential 
to NRSROs’ constitutional defense, because where speech proposes a 
commercial transaction, it is considered “commercial speech” and 
constitutional protections for this speech are narrowed.337 In a 2009 
letter to the SEC, famous First Amendment attorney Laurence Tribe 
distinguishes credit ratings from promotional advertising, stating that 
“NRSRO ratings, by contrast, are independent evaluations that do not 
propose any transaction.”338 Tribe cites Lowe v. SEC,339 which held that 
“expression of opinion about a commercial product” is a matter of 
public concern, extending First Amendment protections to “opinions” 
about marketable securities.340 Applying this precedent, he agrees that a 
registration statement and prospectus can be considered commercial 
speech, but argues that this does not extend to an NRSRO’s opinion 
about a security.341 
A credit rating concerns an economic subject, of course. But it is not 
an advertisement that seeks to encourage investors to purchase an 
instrument; it merely provides information to investors to enable 
them to evaluate whether or not to engage in a transaction. Literally 
countless articles in publications such as the Wall Street Journal and 
Bloomberg serve an indistinguishable function by providing still 
other information to potential investors. Indeed . . . NRSROs 
consistently state in their ratings that their opinions have a limited 
role and are not recommendations to purchase, sell, or hold 
securities. In this respect, a credit rating is “closely analogous to a 
                                                                                                                 
 335. Quinn v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 168 F.3d 331, 336 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 336. Id. at 333. 
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restaurant or performance review, or a Consumer Reports article, in 
the context of the [investment markets].”342 
Tribe further argues that extending Section 11 liability to NRSROs 
would subject them to strict liability for their ratings, leaving only the 
defense that the NRSRO was not negligent.343 He contends that this 
level of liability unfairly shifts the burden of proof to NRSROs, who 
must prove they acted with due care, rather than the plaintiff having to 
prove the defendant’s “actual malice” in typical proceedings regarding 
matters of public concern.344 Facing “crushing liability” to the investing 
community, Tribe argues that “NRSROs rationally would often make 
the choice simply not to speak, to the great detriment of the public 
markets.”345 
It is also argued that a change in NRSROs’ business models would 
do nothing to remedy the First Amendment liability issue.346 Despite the 
inherent conflicts of the issuer-pays model, it is unrealistic to expect that 
NRSROs will be able to generate significant revenue by reverting to a 
subscriber-pays model.347 Laurence Tribe notes significant changes in 
technology—such as photocopying and the internet—as reasons for why 
the subscriber-pays model is not feasible: it has become easier for non-
subscribers to “free ride” on the issued rating information.348 Further, a 
small investor base paying for subscriptions to ratings could not 
                                                                                                                 
 342. Id. (citing Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. CFTC, 149 F.3d 679, 686 (7th Cir. 
1998)). 
 343. Id. at 8. 
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adequately cover the depth of analyses necessary to formulate and 
publish credit ratings.349 The seven registered NRSROs utilizing the 
issuer-pays model account for about 99% of the total outstanding credit 
ratings issued by all ten registered NRSROs.350 Forcing NRSROs to 
adopt the subscriber-pays model would further violate the First 
Amendment, Tribe says, because a speaker is entitled to protection for 
the speech itself as well as how the message is delivered.351 
3. Arguments Against Freedom of Speech Protection 
In a 2002 Enron report, the SEC stated that “credit rating agencies 
seem to be trying to walk a fine line between maintaining their 
enormous market power through both official and unofficial uses of 
their ratings, and insisting their ratings are purely their ‘opinion.’”352 
Rating agencies have had to defend their “opinions” against numerous 
claims including common law fraud, negligent misrepresentation, 
negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, unjust 
enrichment, and aiding and abetting.353 But are they really “opinions”? 
The actual malice standard, consistently applied to NRSROs in 
court, lacks any objective reasonable person standard.354 Under the 
lesser negligence standard, a rating agency could face liability for not 
investigating when a reasonable person would have investigated.355 As 
long as the actual malice standard is applied to NRSROs, they cannot be 
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held liable for negligent misrepresentation.356 Negligent 
misrepresentation, a state-specific tort, requires that plaintiffs 
“justifiably rely on the false information when the agency supplies it for 
the guidance of others in their business transaction and fails to exercise 
reasonable competence in obtaining or communicating the 
information.”357 However, as long as courts seek to protect ratings’ 
public function by accepting a First Amendment defense, credit ratings 
will continue to be treated as opinions. 
Several problems exist with the “opinions” defense. The main 
difference between credit ratings and a newspaper editorial or a weather 
forecast is that CRAs are paid by the companies they rate and know 
their ratings are being relied upon by investors. A meteorologist has no 
financial stake in telling the public “It’s going to be sunny.”358 
Meanwhile, rating agencies “get paid by the people who need a 
prediction of clear skies, and the customers can always ask a different 
forecaster if they don’t hear what they like.”359 Furthermore, there are 
numerous statutes requiring institutions to rely on ratings by law.360 This 
underscores the commercial importance of the ratings and elevates them 
above a weather forecast.361 
Regarding the issue of fraud, S&P defends that it was just as 
surprised as everyone else when its ratings “didn’t pan out.”362 However, 
that defense is questionable at best. The rating agencies likely had an 
idea that they were helping sell packaged loans that sub-prime 
mortgagors simply could not repay. That model of residential mortgage-
backed securities revolved around the notion that housing prices would 
continue to rise annually by double digit percentages. This was an 
unrealistic expectation that NRSROs could have seen coming. With the 
poor creditworthiness of sub-prime mortgagors, it would be hard to 
convince most investors to purchase RMBS securities packaged with 
sub-prime mortgages. But S&P and others likely knew the extent of 
their own influence, realizing that issuing a favorable rating was a 
“golden ticket” for enabling the banks to sell these bundled loans in the 
                                                                                                                 
 356. Id. 
 357. Arthur R. Pinto, Control and Responsibility of Credit Rating Agencies in the 
United States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 341, 353 (2006). 
 358. Segal, supra note 4. 
 359. Id. 
 360. Id.; Watchdogs, supra note 19, at 102. 
 361. Segal, supra note 4. 
 362. Id. 
2012] BELOW THE INVESTMENT GRADE 1109 
AND ABOVE THE LAW 
 
secondary market. Credit ratings became a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
NRSROs profited handsomely by issuing ratings as high as AAA for 
securities that realistically amounted to junk bonds.363  Issuing 
misleading ratings should have crippled rating agencies’ client base and 
reputation. However, due to the success of their tissue-thin First 
Amendment defense, they remain economically strong and poised to 
repeat history. As one blogger writes, continued protection from 
liability—including on First Amendment grounds—is quite fallacious: 
The notion that credit agencies should be immune to prosecution 
when they are clearly complicit in fraud by awarding investment 
grades to investments that they knew were not investment grade is as 
daft as the notion that a con artist should be immune to prosecution 
because the mark should [have] known that it was a con.364 
4. Abu Dhabi and Future Accountability for Ratings 
Decided in 2009, Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley 
& Co., Inc.365 departed from the traditional application of the First 
Amendment to rating agencies.366 In Abu Dhabi, a class of institutional 
investors sought to recover financial losses originating from the 
liquidation of notes that were issued by an SIV, or structured investment 
vehicle.367 Among the defendants were CRAs, a bank, and a placement 
agency.368 The notes at issue were given top-notch ratings: Moody’s and 
S&P both rated them “AAA.”369 The ratings were disclosed by Morgan 
Stanley in a SIV Information Memoranda issued to potential 
investors.370 The SIV collapsed in 2007 during the credit crisis, as it 
became apparent that the subprime mortgages securing the rated notes 
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were of low quality and value.371 Unable to repay the notes’ senior debt 
when it was due, the SIV declared bankruptcy in August 2007.372 
Plaintiffs’ causes of action included common law fraud, negligent 
misrepresentation, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of 
contract, unjust enrichment, and aiding and abetting.373 Predictably, the 
defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.374 
The motion was granted in part and denied in part.375 The importance of 
Abu Dhabi lies in U.S. District Judge Shira Scheindlin’s denial of the 
motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims against the CRAs and placement 
agency for fraud stemming from the SIV’s credit rating.376 
The defendant rating agencies contested that the misrepresentation 
claims were nonactionable due to the immunity of ratings pursuant to 
the First Amendment, and because the ratings were nonactionable 
opinions.377 Rejecting this argument, the Court stated: 
It is well-established that under typical circumstances, the First 
Amendment protects rating agencies, subject to an “actual malice” 
exception, from liability arising out of their issuance of ratings and 
reports because their ratings are considered matters of public 
concern. However, where a rating agency has disseminated their 
ratings to a select group of investors rather than to the public at 
large, the rating agency is not afforded the same protection. Here, 
plaintiffs have plainly alleged that the Cheyne SIV’s ratings were 
never widely disseminated, but were provided instead in connection 
with a private placement to a select group of investors. Thus, the 
Rating Agencies’ First Amendment argument is rejected. 
I also reject the argument that the Rating Agencies’ ratings in this 
case are nonactionable opinions. “[A]n opinion may still be 
actionable if the speaker does not genuinely and reasonably believe 
it or if it is without basis in fact.” For the reasons discussed below, 
plaintiffs have sufficiently pled that the Rating Agencies did not 
genuinely or reasonably believe that the ratings they assigned to the 
Rated Notes were accurate and had a basis in fact. As a result, the 
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Rating Agencies’ ratings were not mere opinions but rather 
actionable misrepresentations.378 
The Court also rejected the defense that CRA disclaimers about the 
use of ratings should make the plaintiffs’ misrepresentation claims 
nonactionable: 
For the same reasons, the disclaimers in the Information Memoranda 
that “[a] credit rating represents a Rating Agency’s opinion 
regarding credit quality and is not a guarantee of performance or a 
recommendation to buy, sell or hold any securities,” are unavailing 
and insufficient to protect the Rating Agencies from liability for 
promulgating misleading ratings. I conclude that plaintiffs have 
sufficiently alleged that the ratings issued by the Rating Agencies on 
the Rated Notes are actionable misstatements.379 
The holding that the First Amendment applies only to statements by 
rating agencies issued to the general public380 is a move in the right 
direction regarding increased liability for losses stemming from 
overrated securities. Where a statement is private or made to a select 
group of people, as in the ratings circulated to investors in Abu Dhabi, 
no such constitutional protection applies.381 The court relies on Dun & 
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss, noting that the ratings at issue were not a 
matter of public concern because they were only distributed to a limited 
group of investors.382 Effects of Abu Dhabi will likely be felt in the 
structured finance arena because many RMBS and almost all CDOs are 
sold in private placements. The Abu Dhabi decision will have an 
expanding impact on liability in future fraud cases against CRAs. 
If the First Amendment defense continues to hold up in court, the 
reputation of NRSROs is unlikely to be rehabilitated. Rather, the 
“opinion” defense will be perceived as a slick legal tactic, further 
exposing that rating agencies did not know much about what their own 
ratings meant. 
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B. THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT OF 2010 
Congress issued a series of unprecedented regulations for CRAs 
with the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010.383 The Act seeks to increase transparency, 
impose guidelines for corporate governance, address conflicts of 
interest, and improve the ratings process overall.384 It provides the SEC 
with greater power to oversee and enforce laws, and seeks to ease the 
ability of investors to bring civil suits against rating agencies.385 Further, 
Dodd-Frank aims to reduce investor reliance on credit ratings by 
promoting use of broader criteria in evaluating credit quality.386 The Act 
begins with a statement of its purpose: 
To promote the financial stability of the United States by improving 
accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘‘too 
big to fail”, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to 
protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for 
other purposes.387 
Under Section 931, titled “Improvements to the Regulation of 
Credit Rating Agencies,” Congress identifies its findings regarding the 
role of CRAs: 
Because of the systemic importance of credit ratings and the reliance 
placed on credit ratings by individual and institutional investors and 
financial regulators, the activities and performances of credit rating 
agencies . . . are matters of national public interest, as credit rating 
agencies are central to capital formation, investor confidence, and 
the efficient performance of the United States economy. 
Credit rating agencies . . . play a critical ‘‘gatekeeper’’ role in the 
debt market that is functionally similar to that of securities analysts, 
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who evaluate the quality of securities in the equity market, and 
auditors, who review the financial statements of firms. Such role 
justifies a similar level of public oversight and accountability. 
Because credit rating agencies perform evaluative and analytical 
services on behalf of clients, much as other financial ‘‘gatekeepers’’ 
do, the activities of credit rating agencies are fundamentally 
commercial in character and should be subject to the same standards 
of liability and oversight as apply to auditors, securities analysts, and 
investment bankers. 
In certain activities, particularly in advising arrangers of structured 
financial products on potential ratings of such products, credit rating 
agencies face conflicts of interest that need to be carefully monitored 
and that therefore should be addressed explicitly in legislation in 
order to give clearer authority to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. 
In the recent financial crisis, the ratings on structured financial 
products have proven to be inaccurate. This inaccuracy contributed 
significantly to the mismanagement of risks by financial institutions 
and investors, which in turn adversely impacted the health of the 
economy in the United States and around the world. Such inaccuracy 
necessitates increased accountability on the part of credit rating 
agencies.388 
1. Corporate Governance and Conflicts of Interest 
Pursuant to the Act, CRAs are required to establish and enforce 
internal controls governing the implementation of and adherence to their 
policies and procedures for determining credit ratings.389 Annual internal 
controls reports shall be submitted to the Commission, which must 
describe the management’s responsibility in maintaining the internal 
control structure and assess the effectiveness of the structures put in 
place.390 In order to ensure the accuracy of ratings, the Act orders the 
Commission to set forth qualification standards for credit analysts to 
make certain that they meet the standards of training, experience, and 
competence necessary to produce accurate credit ratings.391 
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To avoid conflicts of interest, each NRSRO must maintain an 
independent board of directors, meaning that at least half (but not fewer 
than two) of the board members must be independent of the NRSRO.392 
The compensation for these independent board members cannot be 
linked to the NRSRO’s business performance in order to ensure their 
independent judgment.393 The Act further targets conflicts of interest by 
calling for the SEC to issue rules aimed at preventing sales and 
marketing considerations from influencing an NRSRO’s production of 
credit ratings.394 If the SEC finds (after a hearing) that an NRSRO has 
violated this rule, and the violation affected a rating, a credit rating 
agency could have its NRSRO status suspended or even revoked.395 
Additionally, rating agencies must retroactively address conflicts of 
interest by establishing policies targeted at ensuring that former NRSRO 
employees did not succumb to conflicts during their employment.396 The 
agencies must conduct reviews to determine whether conflicts existed, 
and subsequently take necessary action to revise any rating improperly 
influenced by a former employee.397 
How will the SEC administer these regulations and ensure their 
compliance? The Act calls for the creation of an Office of Credit 
Ratings, charged with promoting accuracy and preventing conflicts of 
interest.398 The new Office of Credit Ratings is to be “staffed sufficiently 
to carry out fully the requirements of this section. The staff shall include 
persons with knowledge of and expertise in corporate, municipal, and 
structured debt finance.”399 The Office must conduct examinations of 
each NRSRO at least annually.400 Annual reports are also to be made 
available to the public, detailing the Office’s findings and subsequent 
responses by NRSROs to address “material regulatory deficiencies.”401 
Congress further encourages the SEC to exercise its rulemaking 
authority in order to prevent conflicts of interest arising out of the 
provision of services to issuers unrelated to the actual issuance of credit 
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ratings, such as consulting and advisory services.402 Congress 
empowered the SEC with the ability to temporarily suspend or 
permanently revoke the NRSRO status of any NRSRO that “does not 
have adequate financial and managerial resources to consistently 
produce credit ratings with integrity.”403 
2. Changes to the Credit Ratings Process 
The Dodd-Frank Act also addresses procedures and methodologies 
used by CRAs.404 The Act charges the SEC with the task of issuing rules 
“for the protection of investors and in the public interest.”405 NRSROs 
are required to have their procedures and methodologies approved by 
their board.406 Using a standardized form, rating agencies are required to 
publicly disclose certain information including their rating 
methodologies, the issuer’s data used to calculate a rating, and 
underlying assumptions in order to increase transparency.407 
Additionally, issuers and underwriters of asset-backed securities shall 
disclose any findings from third-party due diligence reports the issuer 
has obtained.408 
Congress also sought to increase transparency in the performance 
of credit ratings.409 This is achieved by requiring public disclosure of 
information on initial ratings as well as subsequent changes to those 
ratings, allowing investors to evaluate an NRSRO’s accuracy and also 
compare ratings performance among different NRSROs.410 The Act also 
calls for NRSROs to consider credible and significant data from outside 
sources in calculating ratings, broadening the scope of ratings beyond 
issuer-provided data.411 
Acknowledging the complexity of structured finance products, the 
Dodd-Frank Act tasks the SEC with conducting a study of the ratings 
process for structured products, conflicts of interest inherent in the 
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issuer-pay and subscriber-pay models, and other related issues.412 No 
later than two years after the enactment of Dodd-Frank, the SEC is to 
submit its findings to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the 
House of Representatives.413 The SEC’s report will also contain 
recommendations for changes necessary to implement the findings, 
whether regulatory or statutory.414 Congress goes a step further by 
attempting to tackle “ratings shopping” in an unprecedented way, 
allowing the SEC to potentially change how a security’s initial rating 
will be selected: 
After submission of the report under subsection (c), the Commission 
shall, by rule, as the Commission determines is necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, 
establish a system for the assignment of [NRSROs] to determine the 
initial credit ratings of structured finance products, in a manner that 
prevents the issuer, sponsor, or underwriter of the structured finance 
product from selecting the [NRSRO] that will determine the initial 
credit ratings and monitor such credit ratings.415 
3. Increased Potential Liability 
As discussed earlier, one of the most significant laws concerning 
CRAs’ liability was former Rule 436(g), which is formally repealed by 
the Dodd-Frank Act.416 Section 939G of the Act reads “Rule 436(g), 
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission under the 
Securities Act of 1933, shall have no force or effect.”417 This provision 
exposes CRAs to liability as experts under Section 11 of the Securities 
Act for consenting to the disclosure of their ratings in a registration 
statement.418 It is likely that stripping 436(g) protection from rating 
agencies reflects the view of Congress that rating agencies act as experts 
and should face liability as such. 
In Section 933, the Act applies the enforcement and penalty 
provisions of the Exchange Act onto rating agencies, allowing for civil 
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suits against CRAs.419 This effectively subjects rating agencies to the 
same penalty standards as public accountants and securities analysts.420 
Congress further exposes rating agencies to liability by altering certain 
culpability requirements for civil suits: 
The Act alters the pleading standards that were implemented by the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 as applied to 
actions for money damages against rating agencies. Under the 
standards in place prior to the enactment of the Act, to survive a 
motion to dismiss a claim based on Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff had to 
allege facts giving rise to a “strong inference” that the defendant 
knowingly or recklessly made a material misstatement or omission. 
In the context of credit ratings, courts required plaintiffs to plead that 
the rating agency did not genuinely believe its opinions regarding 
credit quality or that the opinions lacked basis in fact. Plaintiffs were 
often unable to satisfy this pleading burden in actions against rating 
agencies. Under the Act, a pleading against a rating agency would 
satisfy the state-of-mind requirement if it alleges facts with 
particularity giving rise to a strong inference that the rating agency 
knowingly or recklessly “failed to conduct a reasonable 
investigation” of the factual elements relied upon in evaluating the 
credit risk of the rated security. The determination of what 
constitutes a “reasonable investigation” will be based on a court’s 
consideration of the particular facts and circumstances.421 
The Dodd-Frank Act also changes certain Exchange Act language 
to state that rating agencies must “file” their registration applications 
with the SEC, rather than “furnish” them, thereby subjecting agencies to 
Section 18 of the Exchange Act, which affords a civil remedy for 
misleading statements contained in certain documents filed with the 
SEC.422 
                                                                                                                 
 419. Id. § 933(a). 
 420. Id. Section 933(a) also notes that agencies’ statements are not deemed forward-
looking statements, excluding ratings from the certain safe harbor provisions of the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: 
The enforcement and penalty provisions of this title shall apply to statements made by 
a credit rating agency in the same manner and to the same extent as such provisions 
apply to statements made by a registered public accounting firm or a securities analyst 
under the securities laws, and such statements shall not be deemed forward-looking 
statements for the purposes of section 21E.  
Id. 
 421. Dodd-Frank Commentary, supra note 385, at 75 (emphasis added). 
 422. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 932(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1877 (2010). 
1118 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
Though the extent of rating agencies’ future liability remains 
unclear, these provisions of Dodd-Frank at least recognize that NRSROs 
are part of our economic problem and must be held accountable for their 
statements. Congress has taken a step in the right direction by giving the 
SEC more power to regulate CRAs. By requiring additional disclosure 
to the public and removing NRSRO exemptions from expert liability, 
Congress is sending a message to the major CRAs: You are no longer 
untouchable, and should be liable for materially misleading or 
overstated credit ratings. How the Dodd-Frank Act will impact liability 
is largely contingent on the future success of rating agencies’ First 
Amendment “opinion” defense. Congress has initiated the momentum 
and it is now up to the judicial system to follow through with heightened 
civil liability. 
4. Reducing Reliance on Credit Ratings 
The Dodd-Frank Act seeks to reduce reliance on credit ratings by 
removing certain statutory references to phrases like “investment 
grade,” and encourages institutional investors to utilize their own due 
diligence to eliminate sole reliance on ratings.423 For example, 
benchmark references to credit ratings are altered in the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act, Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and 
Soundness Act of 1932, Investment Company Act of 1940, and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.424 Many of the changes replace the 
phrase “rated investment grade” or “rated in one of the two highest 
rating categories by at least one NRSRO” with “meets standards of 
creditworthiness as established by the Commission,” leaving an open-
ended standard that relies less on ratings.425 Additionally, Section 939A 
of the Dodd-Frank Act calls for each federal agency to review the 
regulations they issue and modify regulations making benchmark 
references to credit ratings by removing those references and 
substituting the standard of credit-worthiness that each agency 
determines is appropriate for such regulations.426 The Act sets a firm 
timeline of one year after the enactment of Section 939A for agencies to 
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conduct such a review.427 Lastly, the Act removes the exemption for 
CRAs from Regulation FD regarding information that has been provided 
to the agencies.428 
5. The SEC’s Implementation of Dodd-Frank Provisions 
After the passage of Dodd-Frank, how has the Commission 
adjusted its staffing and funding to accommodate its new power? 
According to an internal review conducted over several months by 
Boston Consulting Group, the SEC has been too slow to adapt: 
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is short some 400 
employees needed for the regulator to manage its current workload, 
according to a draft of a four-month internal review by Boston 
Consulting Group obtained by Bloomberg News. The review, 
required by the Dodd-Frank Act, backs the claim by SEC officials 
that the agency is underfunded and understaffed as it includes in its 
oversight derivatives, credit rating companies and municipal bonds. 
The study said staffing levels had been on a downward trend since 
2005. To address the manpower shortage, Boston Consulting 
reportedly recommended shifting managers to front-line or support 
staff roles. The consulting firm also reportedly suggested hiring 
temporary workers. However, because of the House Republican cuts 
on federal spending to 2008 levels, a major budget hike for SEC to 
hire more workers has small chances of being approved.429 
Unfortunately, the lack of resources at the SEC undermines the 
congressional objectives laid out in the Dodd-Frank Act and minimizes 
its potential impact on holding agencies more accountable for their 
ratings.430 However, once the SEC is better equipped to handle the 
ratings industry, it is certain that the sweeping changes laid out in Dodd-
Frank will be a push in the right direction for dealing with rating 
agencies. In the meantime, it remains unclear how stringent the SEC and 
Congress will be in enforcing Dodd-Frank provisions, but it is apparent 
that change needs to be made. Congress has laid the regulatory 
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framework with the Dodd-Frank Act, and it is now up to the SEC to 
exercise its muscle to increase CRAs’ transparency, accountability, and 
liability. 
C. THE EUROPEAN APPROACH TO  
CREDIT RATING AGENCY REGULATION 
 
Similar to the United States, Europe is facing the daunting task of 
regulating CRAs, but employing a different approach.431 While the 
United States has enacted stringent corporate governance rules which 
seek to ensure full disclosure, the European Union (“EU”) has instead 
opted to issue codes of ethics for its public companies.432 Such public 
companies have the option of abiding by the code of ethics or disclosing 
the reasons why they have chosen to avoid compliance.433 Further, US 
regulations target disclosure differently than EU regulations: 
By imposing corporate governance rules, the United States intends to 
regulate disclosure on the ‘‘source,’’ thus assuring that information 
is accurate. On the other side, by proposing codes of ethics under the 
disclose or explain rule, the European Union does not address the 
accuracy of the information itself, but widens the array of issues 
which have to be disclosed.434 
The US issues sanctions for non-fulfillment of certain provisions by 
the operation of law.435 The EU approach does not incorporate the law 
until a company decides to neither comply nor explain its non-
compliance.436 
EU rulemaking in this area involves a two-tiered approach: the 
“Winter Report” is the code of ethics at the EU level, while several 
codes/regulations are also implemented at the national level.437 The 
Winter Report encompasses a variety of issues including capital 
formation, types of enterprises, and rules for investor protection and 
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corporate governance.438 The report regards disclosure obligations as a 
paramount concern, under the assumption that increased disclosure 
protects market transparency.439 Thus, its focus is “enhancing corporate 
governance disclosure requirements for listed companies.”440 The 
Winter Report acknowledges that disclosure is an area where self-
regulation has been deficient.441 The following recommendations are 
included in the Winter Report: 
A descriptive statement of corporate governance structure must be 
included in the annual accounts of the corporation. The statement 
should make reference to a particular national code on corporate 
governance (to be adopted by each Member State) and should 
specify the extent to which deviations exist. The Board of Directors 
will be responsible for any non-accuracies of such statement. 
Additional disclosure obligations on corporate governance (to be 
developed by each Member State) are established. Among others, 
information on corporate governance rules, remuneration of 
directors, compensation schemes, independence of directors and 
their qualifications should be disclosed. Additional disclosure 
obligations on corporate websites are also proposed. 
The role of independent directors in the board (as well as in audit, 
nomination, and remuneration committees) is revisited. The Winter 
Report recommends a minimum standard for independent board 
representation of 30 per cent (such a level is recommended to be 
higher than 50 per cent when there are dispersed shareholders). 
Additional rules on voting information and access to shareholder 
meetings are proposed. Responsibilities of institutional investors are 
revisited, mainly as regards their obligation to disclose investment 
policies and the exercise of voting rights.442 
1. European Securities and Markets Authority 
Effective January 1, 2011, the creation of a new regulatory body 
titled the European Securities and Markets Authority (“ESMA”) is the 
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European Commission’s most recent major financial reform.443 The 
ESMA is part of a larger reform package that also includes formation of 
the European Banking Authority and the European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority.444 Also created was a regulatory 
agency to monitor possible threats to the financial system, titled the 
European Systemic Risk Board (“ESRB”).445 
With these new agencies, the EU seeks to prevent future financial 
breakdowns like the most recent crisis. The European Parliament has 
given the ESMA the necessary power to effect change by designating 
the ESMA to take over the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators (“CESR”), and by requiring EU Member States to adopt 
legislative changes by December 31, 2011.446 With an eye on efficiency, 
the EU Commission has integrated a review clause into the ESMA 
Regulation, which will require submitting reports every three years to 
address issues such as whether it is necessary to divide supervision into 
segmented agencies (banking, insurance, occupational pensions, 
securities and financial markets), whether it is beneficial to have each 
authority based in the same city, and whether it is necessary to delegate 
additional supervisory powers.447 
Perhaps most striking about the ESMA is the unprecedented scope 
of its power, encompassing both lawmaking and supervisory roles. The 
ESMA’s influence will be apparent in the financial markets from top to 
bottom. At the legislative stage, the ESMA can “develop drafts of 
binding regulat[ions] and implement[] technical standards . . . .”448 At 
the enforcement stage, it can “adopt a binding decision addressed 
directly to a financial institution requiring it to take the necessary action 
. . . .”449 Market participants are also offered a consultation process by 
the ESMA.450 In the case of emergencies, the EU has empowered the 
ESMA to order that necessary actions be taken by individual EU 
Member States, subject to the Council’s ultimate approval.451 Beyond 
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the aforementioned powers, the ESMA can also mediate among national 
powers: 
ESMA will be able to impose legally binding mediation in cases of 
disagreements between national supervisors, and, if no agreement 
can be reached, within the relevant college of supervisors. Where a 
competent authority does not comply with ESMA’s decision, ESMA 
may in certain cases directly impose supervisory decisions on the 
financial institution concerned. ESMA will also be able to intervene 
as a mediator at its own discretion.452 
a. ESMA and Credit Rating Agencies 
The latest changes in the regulation of CRAs provide the ESMA 
with significant oversight over the affairs of agencies all over the EU. 
By July 2011, the ESMA was in direct supervision of CRAs.453 Known 
as “dawn raids,” the ESMA can “conduct unannounced checks . . . at the 
premises of a CRA, impose fines and [ ] ensure that agencies evaluate 
the accuracy of their past ratings.”454 The element of surprise is likely to 
instill a sense of urgency into CRAs and cause them to remedy any 
potential doubts regarding the accuracy of their ratings. By July 2014, 
all CRAs must be checked by the ESMA.455 It has the right to impose 
fines proportionate to the type of infringement and surrounding 
circumstances.456 In addition to monetary sanctions, “ESMA will also 
have a number of other supervisory powers in cases of breach of the 
CRA Regulation, ranging from the temporary prohibition of issuing 
credit ratings to the withdrawal of the registration altogether.”457 
If that much power was to be given to a governmental agency in the 
United States, it could have a lasting impact on the accuracy of credit 
ratings. It remains unclear whether the Dodd Frank Act’s creation of the 
Office of Credit Ratings will have the potential to effectuate change as it 
appears the ESMA does. Either way, we are on the right track in 
creating an independent agency to specifically address credit rating 
agency concerns. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
As Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley correctly 
pointed out: 
The Dodd-Frank Act itself notes, in the findings of Section 931 
(emphasis supplied): 
(4) Because credit rating agencies perform evaluative and analytical 
services on behalf of clients, much as other financial ‘gatekeepers’ 
do, the activities of credit rating agencies are fundamentally 
commercial in character and should be subject to the same standards 
of liability and oversight as apply to auditors, securities analysts, 
and investment bankers, 
(5) In the recent financial crisis, the ratings on structured financial 
products have proven to be inaccurate. This inaccuracy contributed 
significantly to the mismanagement of risks by financial institutions 
and Investors, which in turn adversely impacted the health of the 
economy in the United States and around the world. Such inaccuracy 
necessitates increased accountability on the part of the credit rating 
agencies.458 
The SEC in its no-action letter response to Ford Motor Credit,459 
permitted the CRAs to bully not only the SEC, but to flout Congress, 
and the will of the people of the United States. In short, the CRAs said, 
if you will not play by the rules we want, we will take our ball and go 
home. What the CRAs want is simple. They want to have their cake and 
eat it too. They are, after all, above the law. They practically have no 
liability for their ratings.460 According to them, their ratings are mere 
opinions, like Zagat’s star ratings for a restaurant.461 They have recruited 
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among the most famous and revered First Amendment scholars to 
successfully defend their position.462 
Recent history has shown that investors have relied on the CRA 
ratings to their detriment (hence, “below investment grade” in the title of 
this Article). Not only have they so relied, they (or their investment 
managers) have in many cases been forced to rely on CRA ratings when 
governing statutes or regulations require them to invest in “investment 
grade” securities.463 “Investment grade” is a “benediction” that is 
conferred by the CRAs only.464 
Keep in mind that Section 11(b)(3)(b) of the Securities Act does 
not create strict liability for experts, nor does it create liability for 
negligence for experts. To meet their due diligence defense, which is 
what auditors and other experts routinely do, CRA experts must merely 
prove that “as regards any part of the registration statement purporting 
to be made upon his authority as an expert or purporting to be a copy of 
or extract from a report or valuation of himself as an expert, (i) he had, 
after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did 
believe, at the time such part of the registration statement became 
effective, that the statements therein were true and that there was no 
omission to state a material fact required to be stated therein or 
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, . . . .”465 In 
other words, they must act responsibly, knowing that investors will rely 
on their expert opinion. In 1933, the House Report concerning Section 
11 of the Securities Act liability “throws upon originators of securities a 
duty of competence as well as innocence which the history of recent 
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spectacular failures overwhelmingly justifies.”466 “Plus ca change, plus 
c’est la meme chose.”467 
Items 1103(a)(9) and 1120 of Regulation AB require disclosure of 
whether an issuance or sale of any class of offered asset-backed 
securities is conditioned on the assignment of a rating by one or more 
rating agencies. If so conditioned, those items require disclosure about 
the minimum credit rating that must be assigned and the identity of each 
rating agency. Item 1120 also requires a description of any arrangements 
to have such ratings monitored while the asset-backed securities are 
outstanding. With the abolition of Rule 436(g) and the imposition of 
Section 11 liability, perhaps the CRAs will do what most people thought 
they did—act competently and carefully. The world of asset-backed 
securities is complex, indeed too complex for the average investment 
advisor or manager to comprehend, never mind the average investor.468 
This means that investors are essentially increasingly forced to rely on 
CRAs as the information concerning these investments is simply too 
difficult to understand. 
We believe that the CRAs should have expert liability under 
Section 11. This may mean that the markets will essentially flee the 
registration route, that is, the public offering route, altogether, as 
Section 11 applies only to registered offerings. Ultimately, the CRAs 
should be held accountable to market participants who justifiably rely 
upon their expertise. One suggestion is that there be created some 
formal, periodic assessment of how accurate the CRAs were in their 
ratings. In other words, somebody should rate the CRAs themselves, 
i.e., rate the raters. 
                                                                                                                 
 466. LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, 9 SECURITIES REGULATION 4267 (3d ed. 2004) 
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1933)). 
 467. The more things change the more they are the same. 
 468. See generally Steven L Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial 
Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 211 (2009). 
